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1
Open Questions in Sovereign Debt
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S

overeign debt markets have demonstrated incredible resilience despite a century of dramatic political and economic upheaval. Among the most remarkable aspects of the contemporary debt
regime is the degree to which expectations of borrowers remain relatively uniform even in the face of such major shifts. These basic expectations resolve into one background rule: sovereign borrowers must repay,
regardless of the circumstances of the initial debt contract, the actual use
of loan proceeds, or the exigencies of any potential default. This is not to
say that countries always pay; certainly, they do not. But the background
rule remains, and it sets the standard by which creditors and others form
their reputational judgments and against which sovereign borrowers are
evaluated and chastised.
This repayment norm helps to immunize the debt regime from serious
challenge and to stabilize the massive sums at stake. In particular, it
buttresses our avoidance of prickly questions about fairness and appropriateness in the international economic arena. Several troubling queries
in recent decades include: Should a black-African-led South Africa really
be expected to repay apartheid era debt? Or, given that Saddam Hussein
was a dictator who used funds for the oppression of a majority of Iraq’s
population, would it be appropriate to require future Iraqi generations
to pay for his iniquity? More generally, who counts as the “sovereign”
in these debt situations—is sovereignty just the legal shell for whoever
happens to control a territory, or does it imply underlying principles of
legitimate representation or public benefit? And how might all this fit
into assessments of a country’s creditworthiness?
Notwithstanding such questions, the repayment norm exerts a particular kind of power in international economic relations by shaping
expectations of appropriate action in the area of sovereign debt. The
rule is strengthened by its popular identity as a market principle, with
effects that can be identified and measured but that ultimately cannot be
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changed. A study commissioned by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted,
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one of the major policy concerns that has deterred some transitional regimes from repudiating “odious” debt from the previous regime is that of
reputation in the capital markets; a transitional regime may be concerned
that creditors will not in the future provide access to funds, because they
are unable to distinguish the exceptional political decision to repudiate
debt due to its odiousness from the general creditworthiness of the regime.1

The narrative shaping such decisions suggests that without the background rule of consistent repayment, reinforced by the disciplining mechanism of reputation, lending to many sovereign states would disappear.
International debt markets in the absence of a clear cross-border enforcement mechanism would be too risky, requiring more information
on sovereign borrowers’ subjective repayment proclivities than would be
worthwhile for any creditor to collect. Although the repayment norm is
most starkly applied in situations of regime change and transitional justice, its expectations filter into the prospects and bargaining positions of
debt negotiations more generally. If repayment is expected even in such
extreme circumstances, then debtors should certainly bear the burden in
other situations that might emerge. By policing the boundaries of the sovereign debt regime—and ensuring that such issues remain marginal—this
rule keeps the core flow of capital safe and relatively free of controversy.
In this volume, I argue that the market narrative supporting the repayment norm is overly simplistic and in some respects entirely wrong.
It forgets to ask key questions about the relationship between sovereign
debt, reputation, and legitimacy over the last century—questions that
have surprising answers embedded in the historical development of modern fi nance, with significant ramifications for how we approach debt
markets in the future. How have we come to think that the norm of
sovereign debt continuity—the rule that sovereign states should repay
debt even after a major regime change and the related expectation that
they will otherwise suffer reputational consequences—is more or less
unavoidable for a working international fi nancial system? Is it possible
to think of an alternative approach—or fi nd one historically—in which
odious debt ideas and selective debt cancellation might be incorporated
into a functioning debt market grounded in reputational assessments?
And if so, why hasn’t such a system developed, especially given the politicized discussions of sovereign legitimacy that have taken place alongside the development of modern fi nance?
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The framing of repayment and reputation as a market principle—
one that disciplines debtors and creditors alike—discourages this type
of questioning in part by propagating the following three assumptions.
First, although creditors may assess a specific borrower’s political characteristics through the lens of sovereign risk, judgments about a borrower’s repayment decisions are not shaped by politics per se. Rather, they
are simply the best objective assessment of a given set of material facts.
Second, the mechanism of sovereign reputation itself is similarly free
from subjective and historically variable political judgments. And third,
all rational creditors are expected to respond in basically the same way
to particular market events—especially those events that challenge the
principle of continuous repayment. Therefore, it is not necessary to study
the historically conditioned identities and interests of particular creditors to understand how capital markets, as a whole, will respond to any
given sovereign action. These assumptions of political neutrality, reputational stability, and creditor uniformity support an assessment that the
basic contours of the sovereign debt regime are effectively unchangeable.
In the following pages, I contend that, far from being the stable and
all but inevitable market principle we sometimes imagine, the debt continuity norm is intrinsically political and historically variable. It has
been shaped over the last century by political actors, broader ideological shifts, and changing public and private creditor structures. To begin
with, any discussion of sovereign debt is rendered intelligible only by
quietly incorporating a defi nition of “sovereignty” that is necessarily
normative. Depending on the theory of sovereignty implicitly or explicitly adopted in international economic relations at any given time, the
practices of sovereign debt and reputation may diverge significantly. Furthermore, creditor uniformity cannot simply be assumed, and in fact
different creditors may interpret—and historically have interpreted—the
same politicized debt repudiation in opposing ways. A close look at the
post-World War I cases of the Soviet Union and Costa Rica suggests
how, under conditions of market competition and ideological flexibility,
creditors can make rational reputational judgments in favor of post-repudiation lending. The absence of similar cases later in the century resulted not from rigid market certainties but instead from changes in
creditor interactions and broader norms of sovereignty. These shifts in
turn followed from choices by actors such as the World Bank, globalizing private banks, and the US government.
What might this theoretical instability and historical variability mean
for the repayment norm today? A strict rule of sovereign debt continuity

Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved.

4

r e t hink in g s o v er e i gn d e b t

after regime change is hardly necessary for workable reputational assessments in international capital markets. Alternative approaches, incorporating ideas of illegitimate debt and allowing for limited cancellation,
emerged historically and could function more fully in the future. Thus
scholarly and popular discussions of sovereign debt have the potential
to be much more wide-ranging than their current contours imply. That
said, the norm is deeply embedded in international fi nance and can’t
simply be argued away, and it is more powerful than much conventionally enforceable treaty law at shaping international actions. Indeed, on
difficult issues like debt repayment after regime change and potentially
illegitimate debt there is no multilateral treaty in force, even despite
several efforts. Legal scholars and activists have attempted to resuscitate
ideas such as a formal doctrine of “odious debt,” according to which a
fallen regime’s debt need not be repaid if it was not authorized by and
did not benefit the underlying population. 2 However, efforts to alter the
repayment standards run up against already powerful practices of debt
continuity—something of a global soft law in hiding—that have the
predictability and compliance pull of conventional law if not its external
trappings.
To think seriously about altering the current framework, then, it is
necessary to recognize its theoretical supports and historical foundations. In this introductory chapter, I aim to lay the groundwork for such
an understanding. I begin by fi lling out the analytical problems with
the conventional approach to sovereign continuity in debt and reputation, and identify opposing “statist” and “non-statist” ways of thinking
through the question. I then highlight how we can study both the historical variation in this norm and its political underpinnings through the
issue of odious debt. This introduction also provides an overview of the
historical arc of my argument, which underscores that other approaches
to debt continuity emerged in the early twentieth century and suggests
how they were covered over by broader political and fi nancial trends
in the latter part of the century. Finally, I discuss the role of power and
interest in the long-term development of a norm that, over time, has exercised significant power in its own right.

Problems with the Conventional Wisdom
The assumptions of neutrality, reputational stability, and creditor uniformity that underpin the repayment norm are, if not entirely mistaken,
at least greatly oversimplified. Although I expand on this claim more
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fully in chapter 2, a quick overview is warranted up front. To begin
with, one of the most puzzling elements of the conventional narrative
is the notion that the sovereign debt regime’s repayment rule could be
apolitical. The mere mention of sovereign debt invokes one of the most
politically controversial concepts in global affairs and international law:
sovereignty. And perhaps unwittingly, a very distinct political theory
of sovereignty supports the current system of international lending. In
discussing arguments that the post-2003 Iraqi regime should be freed of
Hussein-era debt, a Financial Times leader noted, “The principle [being
attacked] is sovereign continuity—the idea that governments should
honor debts contracted by predecessors. Without this, there would be
no lending to governments.”3 Sovereign continuity means that the same
“sovereign” remains, and thus is subject to the same contractual obligations, regardless of any internal political changes. It effectively derives
from what I call throughout this book a strictly statist conception of
sovereignty—the idea that the content of and changes in a state’s internal
structure, interests, and popular support are irrelevant to its status as a
legitimate sovereign and thus to its external relations and obligations.
While this statist vision has deep roots in global affairs, it is heavily
contested in legal and international relations theory, and indeed it has
been subject to debate and alteration over the twentieth century and into
the twenty-fi rst. In particular, the possibilities of democratic sovereignty
or a sovereignty legally bound by constitutional norms are some of the
non-statist concepts of sovereignty that have gained considerable traction in the international arena. An international economic regime more
attuned to these alternative, non-statist concepts should be much more
hospitable to something like the odious debt idea mentioned above—
and thus more amenable to noncontinuity and debt cancellation under
certain circumstances. Indeed, I suggest that the necessity of a statist repayment rule for continued sovereign lending is a contestable claim. But
what is perhaps most puzzling is the way in which, in the face of these
multiple alternatives, a statist political theory has become so thoroughly
embedded in the sovereign debt regime that its deeply political character
effectively disappears.
Turning to reputation does not in and of itself provide a sufficient answer. Just as the rule of continuous repayment depends on a particular
vision of legitimate sovereignty, the reputational mechanism supporting this rule takes the same implicit theoretical approach. The determination of which sovereign a reputational assessment attaches to is
necessarily infused with a background, historically informed political
judgment: Should a recently anointed democratic government, flush from
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the overthrow of a dictator, be assessed as a new, untested sovereign? Or
is it evaluated as a continuation of the previous regime? The statist and
non-statist approaches suggest very different responses. In short, the call
for a reputational assessment does not on its own necessitate the adoption of a statist political theory. It is entirely possible to maintain the
importance of reputational assessments in general while accepting that
debt repudiation should not result in a lending hiatus in all cases. Far
from leading in a mechanistic way to the repayment-as-market principle
conclusion, reputational judgment itself is fairly flexible. This plasticity
suggests that the category of “excusable default”—sovereign defaults
justified by major events such as natural disasters and thus having only
modest reputational repercussions—may be broad enough to include
principled political defaults under certain circumstances.4 It also deepens the puzzle of how the very notion of a working reputational mechanism became so thoroughly intertwined with a statist insistence on debt
continuity that the possibility of alternatives faded away.
Perhaps this all leads to the fi nal key assumption of the market principle story—that rational creditors will respond in basically the same way
to market events, and in particular will respond in the same hostile way
to events that challenge the rule of continuous repayment. 5 Certainly, the
norm of sovereign continuity provides something of a windfall to creditors as a whole; it means that states will be expected to repay debt that
might have been subject to cancellation under alternative sovereignty
frameworks. But even accepting this windfall, what would account
for the conceptual strength of a statist approach relative to all others?
Part of what is interesting is the absence of any acknowledgment that
non-statist concepts are entirely consistent with making reputational
judgments. Is it possible that creditors coordinate to suppress the very
idea that non-statist approaches are possible, including in academic and
broader policy discussions of sovereign debt? This would be quite a feat
of deliberate collusion—one for which there does not appear to be evidence, though such fi ndings undoubtedly would be newsworthy. I fi nd
it more likely that contemporary creditors, and those that write about
them, have been similarly conditioned to understand the rules of repayment and reputation according to a fairly narrow political theory.
But even the initial assumption of a shared creditor interest in universal repayment is problematic, and is not fully supported by the historical
record. To begin with, it is not entirely clear that all creditors would oppose nonpayment in all instances. This could be the case if, for example,
a creditor accepted as plausible the argument that a successor regime
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constituted a new sovereign, worthy of modest and appropriately priced
investment, rather than an intransigent continuation of the previous regime. Such a stance would effectively indicate a reputational assessment
consistent with a non-statist concept of sovereignty. While a creditor
would hardly be keen to hear such an argument from its own debtor,
it might be more receptive to such an argument from a new potential
client, particularly in the context of a competitive market.
Furthermore, there are historical instances in which creditors respond
in entirely different ways to the same debt repudiation. The Soviet repudiation of tsarist debt, perhaps the most notorious default of the twentieth century, is generally proffered as an exemplar of the reputational risk
associated with repudiation, for example in Michael Tomz’s important
work on reputation in sovereign debt markets.6 Read as such, it would
support the repayment rule’s status as a uniform and historically stable market principle. However, as I argue in chapter 3, this reading,
based principally on the fact that the new regime was unable to float
bonds on the international capital markets, overlooks key elements of
the historical record. In fact, while creditors of the previous tsarist regime remained very hostile and insistent on repayment, several newer
American banks actually sought to facilitate long-term bond issues by
the new Soviet government in the 1920s. These banks were halted not
by a reputational assessment—indeed they were impressed by the Soviet
Union’s reliable payment of shorter-term trade credits—but rather by the
US government’s political hostility to the regime. A closer look at both
the theory and history of creditor interaction thus demonstrates that the
existence of a relatively uniform creditor approach to sovereign reputation cannot simply be assumed but has to be explained.
What does this mean for the solidity of the sovereign debt regime, including its bulwark rule of repayment and its coordinating reputational
mechanism? It is true that settled expectations and market practices
have developed, which shut off questions of sovereign legitimacy that
might reasonably be at the center of international lending. An equilibrium of sorts has been reached, and any countervailing pressure has thus
far been insufficient to produce a real shift. But this does not foreclose
the possibility that there are several potentially stable market norms—or
multiple equilibria—that could yet develop or that might have developed
historically under different circumstances.7 The fact that the current system looks to many like an immutable market principle, with seemingly
consistent creditor reputational assessments, constitutes a puzzle in itself. So far, we have yet to see a satisfactory explanation for this puzzle.
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Odious Debt as Sovereignty in Practice
Even if the market principle assumptions underpinning the contemporary norm of sovereign debt continuity do not hold, where does that
leave the repayment rule as a practical, historical matter? For any given
sovereign borrower, international debt practices can still seem an extremely unyielding edifice. Nonetheless, the theoretical instability does
point to the possibility of empirical study and encourage a closer, more
critical look at the historical record. If we know that the current approach is inherently political and necessarily historically shaped, there
should be a way to identify the assumptions and assessments that underlie a particular moment in international fi nance.
Even acknowledging the plausibility of empirical study, asking how
the practices and reputational underpinnings of debt continuity interact
with historically grounded ideas of legitimate sovereignty remains quite
difficult in practice. The issue of sovereignty is notoriously slippery and
does not easily lend itself to concrete examination. And accepting that
a contested concept such as sovereignty plays an important role in any
discussion of sovereign debt and reputation does not in itself grant access
to its workings. Usually, the question of who might constitute the legitimate sovereign in economic relations remains in the background and
is largely forgotten. States enter into and threaten to default on international contracts fairly regularly, and the particularly political character
of sovereign debt is rarely raised by either party.
There are certain types of debt repudiation, however, that bring these
background matters to center stage. Central here is the issue of odious debt, which in the most common formulation arises when an illegitimate regime contracts debt that is not authorized by and does not
benefit a nation’s people. This idea helps us think through questions
of politics and authority in sovereign debt, and makes observable—or
operationalizes, in the preferred language of social science—the idea of
sovereign legitimacy underpinning the debt regime at a given moment.
The classic legal doctrine of odious debt, fi rst developed after the Spanish American War of 1898 and formalized by Alexander Sack in 1927,
states that sovereign state debt is “odious” and should not be transferable to successors if the debt was incurred (1) without the consent of
the people, and (2) not for their benefit.8 This doctrine directly counters
the norm of sovereign continuity in two ways, corresponding to the
two prongs of the doctrine. It fi rst suggests that some form of popular
consent may be relevant to the existence of binding debt obligations,
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contradicting the statist theory of sovereignty that underlies sovereign
continuity. Alternatively, it highlights the centrality of a debt’s purpose
by noting that any binding sovereign obligation must be entered into for
the purpose of benefiting the underlying people.9 As a whole, it remains
fairly conservative—a creditor can expect to be paid so long as the
funds are either authorized by the people or are incurred for the public
benefit.10 Were the doctrine to be adopted more broadly, it is likely that
most sovereign debt incurred in the contemporary era would still be
binding most of the time.
Although Sack’s formulation is the one cited by scholars as “the doctrine of odious debt,” multiple permutations are possible when we consider the many available theories of governmental representation and
legitimate state purpose.11 Indeed, recent scholarship on the idea of odious debt has frequently focused on how it might be altered and applied
as a contemporary doctrine.12 For the purposes of this book, however,
the key point is that all versions of an odious debt idea challenge the
dominant statist vision of sovereign continuity in international economic
relations. If we are concerned with the existence of a stronger representative link between a state and its people, then the idea of certain types
of principled debt cancellation makes sense; it seems philosophically
and legally problematic to expect a state’s people to pay back debt that
they did not authorize and from which they derived no benefit. In other
words, an application of non-statist visions of sovereignty to international economic relations suggests that debt should not be continuous in
some cases. Conversely, if we subscribe to a strictly statist approach to
sovereignty, then it logically follows that all debt should be repaid, even
if it is “odious,” because popular consent and benefit are irrelevant.
The idea of odious debt also gives us some traction in analyzing the
historical record, by hinting that challenges to the norm of sovereign
continuity and uniform debt repayment might be more likely in times of
regime change. Although the enforcement of any sovereign debt necessarily rests on a theory of sovereignty, usually this remains a background
issue. However, when a regime changes, the incoming regime frequently
seeks to distinguish itself from its predecessor, and may consequently
seek to free itself of the predecessor’s debt obligations on the basis of
right. Sack distinguished between proper “national debt” and the “personal debt” of a previous regime, and argued that only the former should
continue to successors:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the
State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that
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fights against it . . . [t]his debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of the power that has incurred it, consequently
it falls with the fall of this power.13

Broadly speaking, regime change constitutes those moments at which a
new agent claims to represent a nation’s people. The most extreme transformation involves state succession, in which there is a change of sovereignty over a given territory, as in the case of decolonization. A change in
government administration stands at the opposite pole, in which there is
a legitimate change in leadership within an existing political and constitutional framework.14 For the purposes of this book, a regime change—
or government succession—is the intermediary action, in which there is
no alteration in the most basic form of sovereignty (which remains vested
in the same territory and people), but where there has been a significant
change in the political and constitutional structure and associated practices.15 The idea of odious debt thus provides some guidance as to the
types of claims states may make in using non-statist concepts to problematize the norm of sovereign debt continuity. It also hints at the times
that states are most likely to make such claims. In short, this framework
helps us think through ways to study how modern debt practices developed toward a relatively narrow approach, that is, to so uniformly expect
a statist continuity practice despite other possible alternatives.
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Broader Politics and Creditor Competition
in the Last Century
Even if the issue of odious debt offers some guidance as to when challenges to sovereign continuity might arise, it leaves open the questions
of which historical period is most relevant for an empirical study and
which factors are likely to be most influential in shaping understandings
of sovereign debt. It also does not address how these elements might
interact and the way in which power and interest, so central in the development of global practices, play into the narrative.
To begin with, the dilemma of where to start a historically grounded
investigation is never easy. This is especially true here, where different
ideas of sovereignty have existed in political and legal thought and practice for a very long time. In this book, I begin the discussion in the
early twentieth century, when questions about legitimate and illegitimate forms of rule familiar to contemporary audiences became more
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prevalent on a global scale. The idea of odious debt itself developed in
part out of admittedly self-interested US actions following the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Spanish Crown argued that the United
States should assume debts that the Crown had contracted on behalf of
Cuba. The United States refused, insisting that the debts were contracted
by the previous Spanish regime in its own interests, which were distinct
from and even in opposition to the interests of the Cuban population.
As such, the United States argued, the debts were illegitimate and should
not be transferred to the Cuban population or its new US protectors.16
As the early twentieth century progressed, such non-statist conceptions of self-determination and popular sovereignty spread more widely.
The aftermath of World War I involved a major overhaul of organizing
principles in international relations, including the beginnings of decolonization and a tentative universalization of the basic animating ideas
of the American and French Revolutions. In particular, different visions
of self-determination became ideals accessible, at least in theory, to all
people for the fi rst time. The new normative framework was promoted
by such ideologically divergent figures as Woodrow Wilson and the early
leaders of the Soviet Revolution. This rejection of imperialism and internal forms of absolutism at the international level, along with the more
global application of ideas of sovereign equality, poses the strongest
historical starting point for questions of political legitimacy in modern
fi nance. In other words, the widespread emergence of non-statist approaches to sovereignty in the early twentieth century presses the issue
of how these concepts were received and developed in the realm of sovereign debt and reputation. And the strengthening of such frameworks
by the late twentieth century makes even more puzzling the question of
why the norm of sovereign debt continuity, grounded as it is in contrary
ideas of sovereignty as physical control, remained dominant in contemporary fi nance .17
Moving to the second question of which elements might be most influential in actually shaping these sovereign debt practices, I argue that
two interacting factors are especially important for understanding how
non-statist odious debt ideas emerged briefly and then declined in the
decades since World War I, allowing continuity norms to develop the
veneer of a market principle. First, I contend that the ways in which
creditors are consolidated or competitive in their interactions and risk
interpretations affect the degree to which non-statist approaches are accepted in sovereign debt. To the extent that creditors view each other
as part of the same group and so have a consolidated interpretation of
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risk, a strictly statist insistence on continuity is likely to be dominant.
In times when creditors are more competitive and they consider each
other to be significant risks, sovereign debt norms should be subject to
greater contestation. Thus, although creditor uniformity is not a theoretical given—contrary to what is frequently assumed—the degree of
creditor uniformity at any particular historical moment remains a relevant factor. As the second key element, shifts in broader norms of sovereignty in the international arena affect the to which we consider odious
debt ideas plausible in international economic relations. A strictly statist
framework of sovereignty dominant in the world at large will support
a similar approach in the area of debt, whereas non-statist sovereignty
norms might problematize the rule of continuity. Although they are not
central in every instance, broader political and legal understandings of
sovereignty (be they statist or popular), political ideology, and insistence
on principle are neither epiphenomenal nor merely “cheap talk.” Rather,
they can play a central role in conditioning the initial assumptions and
ultimate responses of key actors in any sovereign debt interaction. Given
the multiple historical forces that shape these elements, it is difficult as
a matter of general theory to make predictions on the balance between
them. However, the basic character of this relationship is presented schematically in Table 1.1:

table 1.1. Interaction between Creditor Risk Interpretations and Norms of Sovereignty
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Broader Concepts of Sovereignty in
International Relations
Statist Concepts
Dominant
Creditor
Interaction / Risk
Interpretations

Consolidated
(Less flexible; likely to
insist on continuity)
Competitive
(More open to
borrower claims)

Norm of debt
continuity stronger
(Mid-twentieth
century)
Norm of debt
continuity likely
(Any default or
repudiation likely
made on different
grounds)

Non-Statist
Approaches Resonant
Ambiguous
(Depends on strength
of non-statist concepts)
More flexible treatment
& acceptance of odious
debt ideas possible
(Post-WWI)

Open Questions in Sovereign Debt
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An Overview of the Historical Record
What does this mean for thinking through the development of sovereign
debt norms over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-fi rst? The background ideas of political legitimacy grounding any
sovereign loan or any reputational assessment come to the fore through
claims of illegitimate debt. Although instances of debt repudiation are
not numerous, they do suggest that the continuity norm is not predetermined and also highlight how creditor interaction and broader conceptions of sovereignty make flexibility more or less likely at certain
historical junctures.
In this book, I begin the historical narrative in the tumult following
World War I, which accompanied a rise in the non-statist concepts of
sovereignty that should resonate with more flexible debt practices. This
greater ideational openness in the early part of the twentieth century
converged with an injection of fresh competition into the international
credit markets due to the emergence of new American banking houses.
As surplus American capital sought investment outlets overseas, these
relatively young US fi nancial institutions—supported by expanding US
political interests—began to fight for a piece of the credit market previously dominated by British and French banks. These ambitious new
creditors were less concerned by losses imposed on their established
competitors, and remained more open to gaining a potentially reliable
client even at the expense of a commitment to strict debt continuity.
The two early twentieth-century cases presented fully in chapters 3
and 4 illustrate how these emerging principles and market structures
resonated in the world of debt claims. In 1918, the new Soviet Union annulled the foreign loans contracted by the tsarist regime, arguing effectively that they constituted personal debts of the Tsar and not legitimate
debts of the new Soviet Republic and its people. Although this alienated
European and especially French debt holders, several New York banks
that were newer to international lending actually attempted to facilitate
the issuance of Soviet securities in the face of resistance from their own
government. In 1920, Costa Rica repudiated the debts entered into by the
previous dictator Federico Tinoco, after returning to constitutional rule
following a two-year aberration. US Chief Justice Taft, ruling in an arbitration between Costa Rica and Great Britain, distinguished between
debt contracted for “personal” as opposed to “legitimate government”
purposes, and held that only the latter could exist past the downfall of
a regime. Perhaps surprisingly, the Costa Rican regime was not cut off
from the international capital markets as a result of its repudiation or
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Justice Taft’s decision. The victors of World War I also seemed to reference an odious debt idea when they included the repudiation of Polish
debt in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The treaty repudiated the debts
that Germany had contracted on behalf of its colonies, particularly on
behalf of Poland to fund the settling of ethnic Germans in Polish land.
The Reparations Commission took the standpoint that “it would be unjust to burden the natives with expenditure which appears to have been
incurred in Germany’s own interest.”18
This ideational and material background shifted in the post-World
War II era, as I discuss in chapters 5 and 6. Creditors were harmed badly
during the defaults of the Great Depression. In the cautious postwar
economic recovery, they developed closer ties with each other through
international fi nancial institutions such as the early World Bank, private banking integration, and global loan syndications. Creditors became more consolidated in their interpretation of threat through these
interactions, such that questioning the doctrine of sovereign continuity
under any particular circumstance seemed more like an assault on the
rights of creditors generally. As to ideational elements, the concept of
popular sovereignty and the efforts to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate government that dominated post-World War I discourse subsided
in the destruction of World War II. Although the new United Nations
did support local sovereignty and self-determination, these terms during
the Cold War emphasized a norm of nonintervention and ultimately
leaned toward a statist viewpoint. In short, a closing in what constituted
the interests of creditors was matched by a narrowing of the discourse
surrounding sovereignty and sovereign debt.
The cases reflect this mid-twentieth-century trend, and the era did not
follow up on the potential turning point of the post-World War I period.
The People’s Republic of China repudiated the debt of its predecessors,
but remained marginalized in the international credit markets for decades. A repudiation of many foreign fi nancial contracts followed the
1959 Cuban Revolution, and a similar sidelining resulted in that case as
well. The remainder of the Cold War era saw few claims of right associated with an odious debt idea. Even following major social revolutions in
Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, as well as after a series of democratizations
during the 1980s’ debt crisis, countries ultimately adhered to the principle of debt continuity. The statist approach to sovereignty in sovereign
debt, which came under question in the early twentieth century, had
reconsolidated its dominance.
The increasing breadth and depth of fi nancial integration since the
1970s has arguably made “international fi nance” a more singular force
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than in previous eras. Still, the post-Cold War decades have also shown
a degree of movement toward greater flexibility in repayment norms, as
I discuss in chapter 7. In the ideational arena, concepts of democracy
and constitutionalism and more substantial attention to human rights
have made headway. Although a defi nitive claim cannot yet be made, it
is possible that the post-Cold War era and the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century has witnessed a new opening in the sovereign debt regime’s notions of sovereign legitimacy and continuity. The idea of odious
debt has regained some of its earlier traction, and scholars and social
activists have focused on the potentially problematic foundation of a
portion of the developing world’s debt today. As for the creditor interaction factor, a shift to greater use of bonds rather than bank fi nancing has
disaggregated creditors somewhat. In addition, new sources of capital
such as south-south flows and sovereign wealth funds have disrupted
the north-south fi nancing divide of the late twentieth century. However,
countervailing fi nancial trends exist—notably the rising importance of
credit rating agencies and credit default swaps, all of which can unify
the inherently multiple voices of capital into a single chorus. In short, the
credit market structure is more ambivalent in its effect. But some possibility still remains that the historical trend over the last hundred years is
more U-shaped than unidirectional.
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Power, Interest, and Norms in Sovereign Debt
Students of international relations may raise the question here of how
power and interest factor into into this historical narrative. As a general
matter, I agree that actors in the global arena use “power” to further
“interests.” However, this formulation frequently is too indeterminate
to be especially useful, especially for understanding the development of
long-term practices rather than for explaining singular events. In particular, it misses the role that norms themselves—expectations of appropriate behavior shared by a community of actors—have in shaping how
interests are formed and how actors’ capacities are deployed. Understood
most broadly, the work of a norm such as sovereign debt continuity exists through both the expectation or standard itself as well as the ways
in which we understand and speak approvingly about it and the actions
that reflect and reinforce it. Indeed, I view expectations, discourse, and
action as a mutually reinforcing package that develops over time and
that therefore tends to evade ahistorical explanation.
To begin more specifically with questions of interest, part of my argument is that it is hard to know in advance what an actor’s interest
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is likely to be at any given moment. For example, one might say creditors are generally self-interested and concerned with making a profit.
However, this does not necessarily indicate what they will interpret as
the right course of action at a particular historical juncture. Certainly,
as I explain in greater detail in chapter 2, it does not suggest that all
creditors always insist on uniform debt continuity. Indeed, the wildly
volatile trends in what is considered rational, possible, or prudent in
international fi nancial circles bear testimony to this uncertainty.19 It is
also possible that certain creditors have interests beyond pure profit and
actually embrace particular visions of sovereign legitimacy.
Even assuming a profit motivation, I argue in part that larger, historically conditioned structures of creditor interaction are relevant to shaping interpretations of interest and rational action. Individual creditors
may well have created these larger structures—including institutions
such as the World Bank, instruments such as syndicated loans, formal
and informal rules, and so on—to support their own interests at a particular time. But the longer-term consequences of these frameworks tend
to go well beyond the founders’ initial objectives as they take on a life
and dynamic of their own. Farther down the road, these structures can
in turn shape how the same or subsequent actors interpret their interests,
roles, and identities in ways that would not originally have been foreseen. Thus, there is a necessary and mutually constitutive interaction between actors and broader institutions and norms—between agents and
structures—that affect how interests are formed and understood. 20 This
book takes a long view of the development of debt continuity in part to
understand this mutual construction.
Claiming that power matters is similarly indeterminate and overlooks
a parallel dynamic. To begin with, multiple forms of power may be at
work in a particular interaction. First, there is the understanding of
power as the material capacity of a particular actor to shape the actions and payoffs of other actors and thus affect outcomes in its favor. 21
Certainly, such power is manifest in the international arena, as demonstrated by the bribes and threats that sway states toward or against particular actions. However, identifying the powerful actors at any given
moment is unlikely to result in a full explanation—even setting aside
the above-mentioned difficulty of identifying their ex ante interests in
the fi rst place. Different actors at different times may have completely
divergent understandings of how the same capacities translate into actual possibilities for action. For example, counting gunships is unlikely
to be directly helpful in explaining why certain countries are most likely
to have their way in issues of money and fi nance, though there may
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still be an indirect relationship. Modern gunships now are considerably
more powerful than they were in 1902, when the British and German
navies sank Venezuelan ships and bombarded Venezuelan ports in part
to enforce monetary compensation claims. 22 While they would theoretically be as effective against a poor and underdefended state today, this
material capacity is no longer likely to be as useful in enforcing monetary claims, due to intervening shifts in what is considered plausible or
acceptable action. This is not to say that power understood in this way
does not matter, or that powerful actors are not more capable of shaping
outcomes than nonpowerful actors. Rather, physical power controlled
by a given actor is an insufficient explanation for any set of outcomes
without additional understanding of how it is situated in a particular
context.
Relatedly, this defi nition of power as the material capacity of a specific
actor is incomplete. Another more diffuse but no less effective form of
power can exist through shared ideological structures or discourses—
ways of thinking and talking about things in a particular community
(such as the international fi nancial community). If a given set of norms
seems reasonable, plausible, and normal, then any actions that resonate
with these expectations will meet with little resistance or comment.
Conversely, practices that counter these expectations will be treated as
radical and may be resisted. Over time, actors are more likely to make
choices in line with these norms, further strengthening their shaping effect. The discourse and actor practice thus are mutually constitutive and
reinforcing, making the norm appear so natural that other alternatives
become difficult to comprehend. In this way, the norms themselves have
a less visible power that can nonetheless affect outcomes and payoffs as
effectively as any set of material capacities.
In this book, I seek to explain the foundations for the norm of sovereign debt continuity, which exerts this more diffuse power in international economic relations. The way in which we think and speak about
debt continuity acts as a kind of global soft law, shaping expectations
of appropriate action for borrowers and lenders alike and structuring
key moments in debt relations today. 23 This is not to say that there is
a direct causal link between these broader ideational frameworks and
the outcome in any given exchange. However, they enable and promote
particular outcomes and make contrary approaches seem implausible.
In this book, I seek to understand how the norm of sovereign debt continuity—which is always a key factor shaping contemporary debt interactions—gained power in modern fi nance to the near exclusion of other
possible approaches. 24
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Conclusion
The norm of uniform repayment across all sovereign debt, regardless of
its provenance, rarely seems puzzling to those working in the international economic field. Despite an absence of any conventional legal rule
on the topic, the implicit acceptance of debt repayment and its reputational supports as a stable market principle covers over any lingering
questions about the practice. However, the assumptions undergirding
the market principle status of the norm are hardly unproblematic. Far
from being neutral and historically uniform, sovereign debt practices
implicate inherently political ideas and are located in necessarily variable historical contexts. Indeed, such dry inquiries as “is there a reputational effect in sovereign lending” would fail to be sensical without some
embedded vision of sovereignty—one of the most contested concepts in
international relations today. But the norm of sovereign debt continuity
has been so woven into the practice of international fi nance that it is
rarely even questioned, and its controversial political character has all
but disappeared in mainstream discussions.
The very solidity of this norm begs the questions of this book: How
did sovereign debt continuity rise to such prominence in modern international fi nance, despite its incongruence with ideas of governmental
rule that also spread throughout the globe over the last century? Have
approaches emerged that unify ideas of illegitimate debt with working
reputational assessments, and under what circumstances? The fact that
the continuity norm has been more variable than it first appears invites
further study of how the current system developed. Moments existed in
the post-World War I era from which alternative frameworks might have
developed, and I suggest that both creditor interactions and broader
norms of sovereignty shaped the emergence and outcomes of such cases.
These two elements also affected the reduced flexibility in sovereign debt
and reputation in the decades that followed, and are relevant for thinking about how to structure economic governance in today’s unsettled
sovereign credit markets. The issue of odious debt offers some guidance
as to when we might see this usually hidden question of political legitimacy in international fi nance rise to the surface, and also helps us perceive more clearly how certain material and ideational structures might
support one norm over another in the sovereign debt regime.
In discussing these contrasting approaches in the debt arena, I highlight the political choice inherent in the alternatives: a statist theory of
sovereignty necessarily underpinning debt continuity, and non-statist
concepts underlying certain allowances for debt discontinuity. While I
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encourage normatively inclined readers to think through these ethical
questions—as I discuss in the fi nal chapter, the policy issues are complex
to say the least—the book’s primary purpose is not normative argumentation per se. Rather, I contend that the historical contexts in which
odious debt might be an issue offer windows into how market structure
and broader ideologies privilege one approach over another in any given
instance. Studying these cases across time and in relation to one another
sheds light on the historical and political foundations for the contemporary norm of sovereign debt continuity and its reputational supports.
It also casts empirical doubt on the suggestion that the practice of debt
continuity is a historically uniform or inevitable market principle. This
uncertainty should disquiet anyone interested in the foundations and
ramifications of contemporary international fi nancial practice.

2
Theoretical Underpinnings of Modern Finance

And from what book of history has it been read or heard . . . that a
king paid the debt of another king? And no mortal ever discharged
the obligations of his enemies.
—ata-malik juvaini, thirteenth-century chronicler of the Mongol
Empire, Genghis Khan: The History of the World Conqueror
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he norm of sovereign debt continuity is so regularized in international economic relations today as to become largely unremarkable and taken for granted. We tend to dismiss—or even fail to
see—the possibility of alternative approaches to sovereign debt and reputation. This dismissal, it seems, derives at least in part from intellectual
path dependence. Without a closer look at the theory or the history, it
is easy to suppose that current debt practices are the only ones available
and truly workable in a functioning international capital market. And
without fully acknowledging the degree to which theories of sovereignty
are deeply contested, it is also easy to assume that these practices are
ideologically neutral and therefore largely unobjectionable, even if they
may lead to troubling consequences.
While most of this book presents a new narrative of how debt continuity overcame other possibilities to become dominant over the last century, this chapter fi lls out the theoretical background for my argument. I
begin by more fully dismantling the assumptions of political neutrality,
reputational stability, and creditor uniformity underlying any claim that
blanket debt repayment is a baseline rule for a functioning international
capital system. I highlight how conceptions of sovereignty act as principal-agent theories in international relations, and emphasize that these
necessarily politicized concepts are essential for any workable sovereign
debt market. I also demonstrate how the mechanism of reputation is
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sufficiently flexible to incorporate alternative non-statist approaches,
and argue that—far from assuming creditor uniformity—we should expect to see some elasticity in creditor behavior given the complex dynamics at play in debt markets.
In the second part of this chapter, I look more closely at what multiple
ideas of sovereign legitimacy really would mean if brought into the international debt regime, and where these ideas come from. If we accept
that debt mechanisms are indeed more open to non-statist approaches,
what is the range of possibilities? I take this opportunity to draw out
the ramifications for sovereign debt contracts of four alternative visions
of sovereignty with deep roots in political philosophy and international
law. Finally, this chapter addresses how to think about case studies in
understanding ideas of sovereign legitimacy in debt and reputation,
building on the discussion in chapter 1 of how odious debt offers a practical window into these broader questions.
Some readers may already accept the basic openness of market principles and reputational mechanisms in sovereign debt, the possibility of
coherent debt practices drawn from divergent theories of sovereignty,
and the feasibility of a careful historical study of these questions. This
chapter is written especially for those who remain unconvinced.
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Addressing the Conventional Approach
There is an easy supposition that the theoretical underpinnings of the
contemporary sovereign debt market, including its expectation of continuous debt repayment, are fairly stable. I noted in introducing this
book that the seeming inevitability of this baseline draws support from
the assumption that the basic rule is politically neutral, supported by a
clear reputational mechanism, and obliged by uniform creditor appraisals. But each of these conceptual bulwarks for the statist approach is
deeply problematic.

Indispensable Politics: Sovereignty
as the Missing Agency Question
By necessity, the controversial and highly politicized concept of “sovereignty”—which carries with it overtones of legitimate, or at least internationally acknowledged, rule—stands at the center of any discussion
of the sovereign debt regime. As I noted in the introductory chapter, a
particular political vision of sovereignty is already deeply embedded in
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the lending regime. The strict rule of repayment depends upon a distinctly statist concept of sovereignty, which assumes sovereign continuity within the same territory and insists on the irrelevance of changes in
internal rule for sovereign identity. Indeed, there is no way for sovereign
lending to exist without the unspoken adoption of one or another idea
of sovereignty. To the extent that a sovereign debt contract exists at all,
enforceable against future generations of a state’s people, it must at least
implicitly rest on an underlying theory of the relationship between that
country’s government and its people. The fact that we choose to leave
the nature of that relationship entirely unstudied does nothing to diminish its importance.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, fi nancial writers tend to take a dim view of
any impulse to defi ne sovereignty—and therefore implicitly sovereign
legitimacy—in the arena of international debt. The Financial Times preferred a more “pragmatic” approach for post-2003 Iraq, arguing that
“instead of embarking on a theological discussion of whether the debt
contracted by Saddam Hussein is legitimate, creditors should swiftly reduce the country’s debt-service obligations to manageable proportions.”1
The dominance of this ostensibly matter-of-fact approach has helped to
address particular instances of debt restructuring, but leaves embarrassingly undertheorized very basic questions. Who actually constitutes the
ultimate principal in a sovereign contract? If it is the people, what type of
governmental authorization is needed to make such a contract binding?
The seemingly abstract discussion of legitimacy in fact fills an important and surprising gap in our practical understanding of sovereign debt
contracts. Whereas a relatively clear theory of agency and authority is
central to the modern practice of domestic contract law, the dominance
of short-term pragmatism has left us with long-term practical confusion
in the international realm.
It would help if we recognized that different theories of sovereignty
in fact act as alternative theories of agency in the international context,
whether or not they are expressly recognized as such. Any valid domestic contract made on behalf of another entity is at least implicitly (and
frequently explicitly) grounded in a theory of agency. And any theory of
agency identifies the nature of the relationship between the agent—who
acts or enters into the contract—and the principal, the entity against
whom the contract is ultimately enforced. Agency theory specifies the
conditions under which a principal will be forced to perform on the
contract made by the agent. Usually the agent must be retained or acknowledged by the principal for its actions to be respected. For example,
if a Chief Financial Officer (the agent) enters a contract on behalf of
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a company and ultimately the underlying shareholders (the principal),
then the company is likely to be liable for that contract. However, any
so-called contract made by a deranged junior employee who has taken
the company hostage is unlikely to be respected—unless the resurrected
company later has the opportunity to affi rm the contract—because there
is no legitimate agency relationship in this scenario. This assumption of
consent and ultimate ownership also underpins the expectation that the
principal (the shareholders, collectively) will be the residual claimant in
any fi nancial restructuring or bankruptcy proceeding, receiving only the
leftovers once bona fide creditors have been satisfied.
If the relative simplicity of this distinction between legitimate and illegitimate domestic contracts falls apart when we move to the realm of
transnational sovereign debt, it is in part due to the lack of a clear theory
of agency in the international arena. The confusion would be as bewildering in domestic contract law if we insisted upon the validity of all debt
contracts undertaken on behalf of “The Coca-Cola Company” without
specifying who could act on behalf of Coca-Cola and under what conditions. Just as we assume a defi nition of who counts as “Coca-Cola”
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate Coca-Cola debt contracts, we would need a defi nition of who counts as “Ruritania”—that
fictional country of law school exams—to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate sovereign contracts signed in Ruritania’s name. In
short, what is missing from the current discussion of sovereign debt is a
clear idea of who counts as “sovereign” in a sovereign contract.
This is where the seemingly abstract discussion of politics and
sovereignty becomes immediate and concrete. Different theories of
sovereignty effectively constitute different theories of agency in the international realm, with divergent ramifications for whether or not a sovereign contract is legitimately enforceable. A theory of agency specifies
the nature of the relationship between the agent—who acts or enters into
the contract—and the principal, against whom the contract is ultimately
enforced. Similarly, a theory of sovereignty specifies the nature of the
relationship between the sovereign government—the agent who acts or
enters into a contract—and the principal, the people against whom the
contract is ultimately enforced. Just as different theories of agency will
result in differential enforcement of domestic contract obligations, different conceptions of sovereignty should result in differential treatment
of sovereign contract obligations. Or from an alternative perspective,
calling any given sovereign contract “legitimate” necessarily implies and
reinforces a particular idea of sovereignty, and thus validates the mode
of rule upon which it rests. 2
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In short, the current system of sovereign lending already, and necessarily, rests on a concept of sovereign legitimacy that takes the role
played by agency theory in domestic contract law. It serves as an unacknowledged support in the otherwise somewhat mysterious act of complex, agent-based sovereign contract-making—that is, the conversion
of a fleeting promise by an individual or group of individuals into a
permanent obligation for an entire population. Failing to discuss the
concept of sovereignty underlying sovereign debt contracts does nothing to eliminate this political choice entrenched at the very core of
international economic law. It only leaves the system’s analytical foundations unclear and undertheorized. Even if particular creditors do not
deliberately choose one political theory over another, they participate
in a collective practice that depends upon and reinforces a profoundly
political judgment.

The Indeterminacy of Sovereign Reputation
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Turning to reputation or creditworthiness does not escape from this
foundational puzzle. An implicit determination of legitimate sovereignty
is just as embedded in any reputational assessment as it is in the appraisal
of a sovereign debt contract’s basic validity. And although an insistence
on the strict rule of repayment seems to assume that only one analytical
angle is possible, in fact the reputational mechanism is flexible enough
to incorporate a range of statist or non-statist approaches, including approaches that would allow for debt cancellation. Given the variety and
different placement of creditors, it would be surprising for only a single
sovereign reputational assessment to emerge.
The Positional Aspect in Reputation
This is not to reject the importance of reputation itself. Indeed, reputation, broadly understood, has been put forward as a key driver for
compliance with international legal agreements by multiple scholars. 3
The specific question of why states comply with international debt contracts has been taken up most extensively in economics and international
political economy, where arguments exist between those who contend
that debt repayment results from a fear of direct retaliation, and those
who argue that it follows from concerns about reputation.4 While an
extensive literature review is not necessary, the evidentiary support for a
general reputational effect in the debt arena does seem strong. Michael
Tomz’s in-depth analysis, perhaps the leading account of sovereign reputation in international political economy, highlights the centrality of
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reputational factors in ensuring continued cooperation between creditors and sovereign borrowers. Tomz argues that creditors consider both
payment record and the situational context of repayment to develop beliefs about a borrower’s type—that is, whether it is a “lemon” that will
default without justification, a “fair-weather” that will repay only when
times are good, or a “stalwart” that repays in good times and bad. This
belief on the part of international investors in turn constitutes the borrower’s reputation, which guides creditors’ risk assessments and lending
decisions.5
Tomz provides a compelling argument for the centrality of sovereign
reputation generally, and even explicitly builds political or governmental
change into the model. He highlights that the inevitability of governmental change makes reputations in sovereign debt “fragile,” in that investors will recognize that a new government may have a different policy
preference than previous governments. They may therefore downgrade
or upgrade a state’s reputation as a whole, depending on the actions of
the new governmental actor.6 In this presentation of political change
and reputation, however, Tomz accepts the basic statist understanding
of reputation as continuous across (though also changeable by) different
regimes. He does not consider the possibility that a new regime might
constitute a new sovereign altogether, in need of a fully separate reputational assessment. As such, he neglects the even deeper way in which the
content of reputation depends on broader contexts that change across
time, place, and creditor. He falls more neatly in line with the suggestion
that the rule of repayment, as the core of debtor cooperation in the sovereign debt regime, serves as something akin to a uniform and ahistorical
market principle due to the mechanism of reputation. Tomz thus overlooks the ways in which the practice of assessing sovereign creditworthiness may well be contingent upon the assessor’s position and ideological
inclinations.
But as Ashok Vir Bhatia points out, the limited predictability of sovereign economic and political behavior, as well as the absence of widespread
robust statistical testing, “leave[s] the task of credit ratings assessments
poorly suited to formulaic straightjackets.”7 Market research into sovereign creditworthiness necessarily blends objective analysis with subjective debate. Even in theoretical studies from economics and fi nance,
there have been questions as to the degree to which reputation-formation
and perceptions of credibility are fully uniform and “rational” in the traditional sense. Robert Frank, for example, has highlighted how emotion
plays a key role in the formation of reputation, apart from any objective
or material determinants.8 James Forder points out that defi nitions and
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perceptions of “credibility” are not a given across different professional
groups.9 Academic economists and central bankers, for example, have
very different views on the importance and defi nitions of “credibility,”
and Forder contends that this has ramifications for the ways in which
credibility as a concept can be abstracted for the purposes of both academic studies and policy proposals. Jonathan Mercer draws from the
insights of psychological theory to suggest that reputation-formation
fundamentally links to a human tendency to attribute only negative or
undesirable outcomes to another actor’s character or reputation. Desirable positive outcomes, on the other hand, become associated with the
other actor’s situational context and thus a “good reputation” can never
really develop.10 And Rachel Brewster considers the limits of existing
reputational models in international law, disaggregating and temporalizing both the “state” and the external audience for state actions in ways
that parallel several of the conceptual claims in this book. In particular,
she emphasizes the shifting nature of how domestic actors value the reputation of the state that they represent, and also focuses on the degree to
which external actors account for governmental and issue variability in
ascribing reputational consequences to state actions.11
These studies of the foundations of reputation question whether it is
constant and objective in the sense assumed by much economic, political, and legal analysis, and suggest that we should be looking for something other than uniformity in creditor action. It is not generally agreed
upon that reputation is a stable factor with contours that do not vary
across time, context, or creditor. Even accepting creditors’ basic profit
orientations, then, more attention should be paid to their relative economic positions and larger social contexts. While creditworthiness may
be uniformly important, its particular content vis-à-vis principles of sovereign continuity or odious debt will still be embedded in a historically
contingent economic and ideational framework.
The Politics in Reputational Judgment
Privileging a conceptual framework that assumes plurality rather than
homogeneity encourages a closer look at how different approaches to
legitimate sovereignty and debt continuity would lead to confl icting reputational assessments. Just as any claim about the validity of sovereign
debt links to a claim of who constitutes the “sovereign” in sovereign
borrowing, any claim about sovereign reputation implicitly rests on an
underlying political and legal theory. In particular, while a state could
never develop a positive reputation after a repudiation on the basis of
an odious debt principle, it is an open question as to whether a negative
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reputation should necessarily result. A creditor or other international
economic actor could reasonably understand that the willingness of a
new regime to repay a loan depends on the degree to which its population benefited from or authorized the loan.12 If a previous obligation was
used to oppress the population or was entered into in order to facilitate
corruption, then a subsequent regime’s willingness to repay this debt
may not have much bearing on its readiness to pay legitimately contracted or publicly beneficial loans in the future.
Any acceptance of an odious debt idea, which might highlight the
importance of authorization and/or public benefit, thus suggests the
presence or plausibility of non-statist approaches in sovereign reputational analyses. If such an argument were made and accepted by a creditor after a regime change, the incoming regime would be treated not
as a “lemon,” in Tomz’s typology, but rather as a new or unseasoned
borrower. Conversely, a statist concept of sovereignty, supportive of the
continuity norm, would not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate debt in assessing a new regime’s repayment record as part of a
creditworthiness analysis. In fact, a strictly statist approach would be
most hostile to repudiation on the basis of something like odious debt,
given that there is no acceptable economic reason for the default.13 Shifting perspectives somewhat, the degree to which an implicit or explicit
reputational assessment accepts or rejects an odious debt idea operationalizes the concept of sovereign legitimacy underlying reputation for any
given creditor. The reputational interpretation and fi nancial treatment
of a borrower as new/unseasoned rather than as a lemon indicates the
acceptance of a more open approach to sovereignty and debt continuity
on the part of that creditor, and an alternative politics in this area of
international fi nance.
Thus, while I agree that “reputation matters,” such an assertion on its
own is indeterminate for a range of politically, legally, and financially
pressing questions, given that the meaning of reputation itself is more
open than usually acknowledged. It also fails to recognize the historical
possibility that creditors may implicitly accept a non-statist perspective
on debt continuity—that is, the prospect that they would make reputational assessments that do not insist on debt continuity in all cases,
while still considering creditworthiness analyses an important tool for
capital markets. While many discussions of sovereign debt thus implicitly set aside (or exogenize) the actual theoretical content of sovereign
reputation, I begin by endogenizing the idea of sovereign reputation itself and so locating it within broader theoretical and historical contexts.
Certainly, the fact that reputation aligns equally well with statist and
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non-statist approaches only makes more puzzling why the norm of debt
continuity became prevalent in modern international fi nance.
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Further Unpacking Creditor Interest
Related to the conjecture that there exists a uniform idea of reputation
and a market principle of consistent repayment is the assumption of a
unified “creditor interest.” I noted in the introductory chapter that too
quick a recourse to “interest” and “power” tends to result in overly simplistic and ultimately indeterminate explanations. Interest depends upon
particular circumstances and identities that may shift over time, and
power has multiple facets, including as the often less-recognized power
exerted by norms themselves. Still, as a general matter, capital market
lenders might be expected to have a strong preference for maintaining
sovereign debt continuity, given the sizable distributional consequences
at stake. What I call a strictly statist account of sovereignty, in which the
fact of state control is sufficient regardless of the internal mechanism of
control, supports the repayment of debt despite concerns about internal governmental illegitimacy. Disregarding any expectation of internal rule of law, legitimate borrowing purpose, or democratic legitimacy
as a factor in lending and repayment would allow occasional windfalls
to creditors. In asking why a statist norm of repayment has become so
regularized as to appear inevitable, one immediate possibility therefore
rests with the interest and significant persuasive capacities of previous
generations of creditors.
Such a hypothesis, while initially plausible, still offers an insufficiently nuanced view of creditor interests. In particular, this “creditor
power” hypothesis fails to recognize that while creditors may at times
have shared interpretations of interest and threat, tending toward debt
continuity, such consolidation is not inevitable. At certain historical moments, creditors may well identify other lenders as primary threats, and
look more favorably upon potential borrowers. In such situations, sovereign lending practices are likely to be more receptive to sovereign debtor
concerns. To add nuance to the “creditor interest” argument, I suggest
that the degree to which creditor interactions are competitive or consolidated—rather than creditor power in general—may affect the degree to
which the rule of continuous debt repayment is stable.
We often speak of “creditors” as if they were a single roving pack,
and to some degree this rings true. Leaving aside public creditors for a
moment, most creditors have analogous goals—to recoup investment
expenses and make productive use of their capital—and are generally
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privy to the same types of information and analysis. Frequently, creditors will respond similarly to similar situations even in the absence
of any collusion. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the fact
that they—like all actors—are embedded in a collective world and are
therefore both social and strategic. Their interpretations of default or
repudiation should thus reflect both their general social proclivities and
their strategic positions vis-à-vis other creditors. As such, I disagree
with Tomz and others who may argue that, in all instances, “If a government defaults without adequate justification, it acquires a lemonlike
reputation not only in the eyes of current investors, but also in the estimation of other individuals and institutions around the world.”14 Or
more precisely, I argue that investors and institutions can differ significantly on what counts as “adequate justification” in ways that have not
been identified previously.
In fact, there is little reason to expect that creditor interests in the
arena of sovereign debt will be entirely uniform, given that they respond
to two principal sources of risk. First, creditors as a whole face the threat
of default and repudiation, and in this sense have a shared perspective
vis-à-vis sovereign debtors. Debtors, however, are not the only, or even
the most pressing, source of risk for creditors. Other lenders constitute
a second threat, as a healthy credit market is driven partially by competition between suppliers of credit for the same borrowing client. The
prospect of losing clients to competitors thus represents a second central
problem for creditors.15
How might this framework interact with questions of sovereign legitimacy to strengthen or weaken the norm of repayment in international
debt? As long as major creditors identify nonpayment of loans as the
central threat in the sovereign debt market, then a hegemonic insistence
on the payment of all debt, including potentially “odious” debt, makes
sense.16 This effectively adopts and strengthens the purely statist political framework of sovereignty that coincides with such a practice. This
creditor approach should be more likely to emerge when the market is
consolidated, that is, when the underlying material and social structures
of creditor interactions encourage more unified interests and risk interpretations. In this case, creditors consider their own fate to be intertwined with that of their fellow creditors, and the perceived threat of
creditor competition and client poaching recedes while that of sovereign
state default becomes more dominant. As such, they will be more hostile
toward debtors who refuse to pay previous loans and less solicitous of
the views of potential borrowers. Borrowers facing a limited set of intermediaries for capital will have little recourse but to accept the terms set
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by these creditors working together. In a consolidated context in which
the interest of one is the interest of all, creditors will have little incentive
to accept claims based on a non-statist view of sovereignty. Even if one
creditor considered the odious debt argument valid, its relationship with
other creditors, including the discontented debt holder, could prevent its
acceptance of a more flexible approach. Although it is difficult to place
a monetary value on the exclusive adoption of a concept, the ascendance
of a statist political theory in the sovereign debt regime—with its occasional windfalls to creditors—effectively grants a conceptual monopoly
as fi nancially valuable as any other monopoly. Over time, this conceptual monopoly can gain the appearance of naturalness or inevitability,
including to creditors themselves, achieving the stable status of a market
principle. Such a status would eventually make alternative approaches
seem impracticable and thus shape the underlying theoretical context of
sovereign lending in the long run.17
However, this naturalization is hardly inevitable. We can imagine that
in a market with more competitive creditor interactions, in which creditors view not only the sovereign debtor but also fellow creditors as risks,
the preferred approach should not be so uniform. In this case, creditors
may be more anxious to protect their links to existing clients and to
lure new clients away from potential competitors. While the holder of a
particular debt instrument will prefer a strictly statist repayment framework as to that instrument, other creditors hoping to attract the same
borrower may be more flexible. A new creditor, in the hopes of displacing a competitor, may be indifferent as to whether a prospective client
pays that competitor’s arguably illegitimate loan obligation. This underlying desire could reasonably lead to a weaker insistence on the norm of
sovereign continuity and a more flexible perspective on who counts as
the “sovereign” in sovereign debt. So long as a potential borrower looks
like a good credit risk overall, a new creditor—considering the new regime an unseasoned borrower rather than a lemon—may be willing to
extend credit even after repudiation.18 Thus, a more competitive credit
market should be more lenient toward sovereign governments that repudiate arguably illegitimate debt.
How would this dynamic play out in practice? Creditors do incorporate
the possibility of political instability and regime change when assessing
country risk. In this context, lenders may pay attention to sovereign legitimacy if they believe that the debt contracts of less oppressive regimes
will result in higher rates of repayment even in the absence of accepted
odious debt ideas. However, creditors as purely fi nancial actors have no
foundational need for a discussion of whether sovereign borrowers are
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internally legitimate. Under the statist background norms of the current
fi nancial system, lenders are entitled to the repayment of all debt. Therefore, they are unlikely to consider independently any explicit questions
of sovereign legitimacy, at least to the extent that they are principally
profit-motivated. Non-statist alternatives in the debt regime are likely
to remain in the background until pressed by a sovereign government,
either upon repudiation or when seeking to borrow after a repudiation
or default. As such, a creditor’s receptiveness to borrower government
claims may well mediate the relationship between ideas of sovereign legitimacy, market competition, and practices of debt continuity.
Starting from the premise of uncertain and potentially confl icting
creditor interest, the contingent features of any given historical moment—or any given country case—should mediate the degree to which
creditor interactions are competitive and thus receptive to alternative approaches presented by borrowers. For example, as I highlight in the Soviet Union case in chapter 3, broader economic problems and a difficult
market might heighten the belief that competitors (rather than valuable
borrowers) constitute a principal risk. Similarly, the borrowing capacity
or market power of a potential sovereign borrower can alter this calculus, deepening rifts between creditors in a given case. Geopolitical
struggles often provide the backdrop for overseas lending, and competition or cooperation in the political arena could also condition what
is considered risky or logical in the economic realm. By contrast, expanded social and fi nancial links between creditors, which could emerge
through geographical integration and creditor cooperation in syndicated
bank loans, for example, can enhance the degree of consolidation at any
given moment. As a historical matter, each of these dynamics has been
relevant to the construction of sovereign reputation over the last century.
In short, although creditors may proceed jointly with regard to a
particular debt event, this is not always the case. Nor is it necessarily the case that creditors should deliberately think and act together to
strengthen a norm of debt continuity across many decades. Rather, they
are more likely to take steps that serve particular short-term purposes,
which when aggregated result in overall patterns of creditor interaction
that can help to either strengthen or diminish statist debt practices over
time. And the debt continuity norm, once emerged, may in turn affect
creditors’ interpretations of their interests in a cyclical manner. Similarly, if a noncontinuity norm were to become dominant, that would also
shape creditors’ assessments of their own and other creditors’ interests
and likely actions. Thus, questioning the idea of a monolithic creditor interest in sovereign lending only makes more apparent how the sovereign
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debt regime’s repayment rule, reputational underpinnings, and implicitly
statist political ideology are more contingent than they initially appear.
Two alternative logics exist for creditor preferences, depending on the
nature of their interactions and interpretations of risk. The dominance
of one or another logic remains a question of historical investigation
rather than theoretical presupposition.
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The Multiple Roles of Public Creditors
Of course, this analysis may change somewhat for public creditors, who
have distinctive goals and concerns stemming from their more explicit
dual role as both fi nancial players and broader norm-propagating actors. Although international creditors are frequently discussed as a single category, public creditors’ particular motivations and organizational
structures can affect their lending purposes and interactions.19 While the
nuances of this difference come through more clearly in my historical
narrative, three distinctive features bear upon the debt continuity norm
and should be applicable to other issues of international economic governance as well: Public creditors are generally less focused on competition,
more explicitly public-minded, and more concerned with the “power of
the purse” than with profit. While these features are not equally relevant
to all public creditors, highlighting them in advance helps to identify the
pressures at work over the last century.
One of the central characteristics of a public as opposed to a private
creditor is its different approach to competition, and especially its lower
competitiveness relative to market actors. In particular, the publicness
of these lenders obviates the way that market competition, absent any
contrary consolidative pressures, encourages efforts to solicit and retain
borrowers. The classic public actor is established not out of a profit motive but rather to instantiate some broader goal or idea of the public
good. 20 As such, public lending results in a different relationship with
debtors and with the sovereign credit market as a whole. With regard
to their potential borrowers, these creditors’ ideological perspective and
relative lack of concern with profit will make them less inclined to court
potential borrowers by giving greater credence to their independent
viewpoints and claims. They may be less willing to think seriously about
the degree to which reluctance to make payments on previous, arguably
illegitimate debt actually predicts the likelihood that comparatively legitimate loans will be repaid in the future. Although public creditors
(as with most explicitly political actors) should want to keep borrowing
countries within their policy circle, they may be less likely to moderate
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their own outlook or ideological position as a result of borrower pressure. In short, the legitimacy claims and other substantive arguments of
a borrower could, paradoxically, fall on less receptive ears.
In addition to this basic motivational difference, public creditors are
rarely part of a very large market of similar actors, with similar goals,
providing similar services. Because of their distinct and sometimes
highly individualized goals in lending, any competition between public
creditors that does exist will take on a different cast. Public lenders (and
public actors more generally) will be less concerned with the actions of
other creditors as competitors for the same borrowers, although they
may view such creditors as a threat to their own policies or goals and
challenge them on this front. 21 As I discuss in the following chapter,
this was the case to an important degree in successful US governmental
efforts to prevent American banks from financing the Soviet Union after
its debt repudiation at the end of World War I. The normative position
taken by public creditors may be enhanced and eventually naturalized
if there is little competition from alternative, private sources of funding—as was the case with World Bank lending in post-World War II
international fi nance. Such oligopoly will make public creditors even less
open to borrower claims, and thus can further close off the potential for
borrowers’ assertions about sovereign legitimacy to make any headway.
Whereas general publicness tends to minimize the way in which competition can make creditors more open to borrower claims, the more
overt public-mindedness of such actors cuts in both directions. Public creditors have a unique dual role in international lending, as both
participants in the broader credit market and as norm-generating and
norm-enforcing actors in their own right. This explicitly social outlook
may involve an ex ante commitment to ensuring that public resources
benefit a state’s underlying population, or to promoting the rule of law
or more democratic forms of sovereignty. In this case, a public creditor’s position as a noncompetitive and even monopolistic or oligopolistic
actor would be overshadowed by a deeper commitment to particular
political values. This is the case for certain contemporary creditor countries, such as Norway, which have taken the lead in propagating odious
debt ideas, as I note in chapter 7. On the other hand, a commitment to
imperial projects or to an ideologically based economic policy vision
(such as communism or capitalism) could undermine attentiveness to
questions of legitimate sovereign statehood, as I discuss with regard
to the mid-twentieth century and the Cold War in chapter 5. In short,
rather than understanding these actors as creditors whose outlook is
somewhat modified by their public characteristics, in some cases it may
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make sense to focus on them fi rst as public actors whose credit activities
serve larger public goals.
Finally, the power of the purse, which holds public creditors accountable to their funders, may well shape their ultimate viewpoints. 22 This
power is likely to be especially strong because the interests of borrowers
are less of a countervailing force. Whereas a private creditor balances
the demands of its own investors (generally for higher rates of return)
with those of its borrower clients, 23 public creditors may be less concerned with the independent views of debtors due to the noncompetitive dynamic noted above. While this funding element can reinforce
the public-mindedness just discussed—after all, those who launch and
fund a public creditor presumably do so for a social purpose—this effect
is hardly absolute or permanent. Although a public creditor’s founding
members formulate its initial goals, they may also establish a funding
structure that renders the creditor dependent on external actors whose
interests are in tension with those original goals. 24 As I discuss in chapter
5, this analytical framework helps to make sense of why the early World
Bank ultimately adopted a strictly statist approach for its own lending
and creditworthiness analyses.
In short, to speak of creditors as a single group in sovereign lending
is not only historically problematic but also theoretically untenable. Although greater uniformity may exist at particular moments, the competitive pressures on private creditors and the unique characteristics of
public creditors mean that these moments should provoke additional investigation rather than simply solidify preexisting assumptions. Neither
creditor uniformity, nor the mechanism of creditworthiness, nor a claim
of political neutrality is sufficient explanation for the market principle
expectation of continuous debt repayment. This leaves us with unanswered questions as to how sovereign debt and reputation can be understood as a theoretical matter, and why it has been framed in particularly
narrow ways as a historical matter.

Alternative Sovereignties and their Ramifications
If the norm of debt continuity cannot be accepted as a neutral market principle with which all reasonable people must agree, nor does it
emerge from the idea of rulership itself. In the current international system, the mechanisms of sovereign rule are tied to, and perhaps hidden
by, the trappings of statehood. But imagine a world of personalistic rule,
in which “sovereigns” exist not as states but rather as human beings
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with defi nite, if unpredictable, mortality. A conquering sovereign in this
world might take over a rival’s territory, neutralize his descendants, destroy his monuments, and otherwise banish memories of the previous
rule. If the creditors of the deposed ruler approached the new sovereign
requesting payment of the previous regime’s debt, they might be as likely
to leave without their heads as with their principal plus interest.
While this hypothetical is somewhat extreme, it is far from a fantasy, as versions of such personalistic dominion have existed throughout human history. An incident recorded by thirteenth century Persian
chronicler and Mongol bureaucrat Ata-Malik Juvaini highlights how
expectations of noncontinuity might seem reasonable under these alternative forms of rule. When Mengü (grandson of Genghis) was elected
Great Khan by an assembly of Mongol princes in 1251, the debts of his
predecessor and fi rst cousin Güyük were presumptively erased, notwithstanding the family connection and the relatively orderly nature of the
succession. 25 A discussion of appropriate debt practices resulted from an
appeal by certain of Güyük’s creditors, whose “cause was lost” but who
nonetheless approached the new ruler, “partly hoping for his justice and
partly despairing.” Juvaini notes that “all the functionaries of Court
and Pillars of State were of [the] opinion that there was no obligation to
pay the amount due . . . and that no mortal would have cause to object.”
After all, “from what book of history has it been read or heard from
reciters that a king paid the debt of another king? And no mortal ever
discharged the obligations of his enemies.” That Mengü ultimately did
compensate the creditors for the debts of his predecessor was considered—far from the creditors’ right—evidence of the new Great Khan’s
generosity and noble character. 26
The fi nancial context of the Mongol era differs radically enough from
our own that few direct lessons can be drawn from this anecdote. But it
is telling that economic advisors of civilizations past might have scorned
the expectation that a new government—particularly one antagonistic to the previous regime—should make good on all its predecessor’s
debt. Episodes in later centuries, several of which I discuss at length
in this book, suggest continuing distaste for discharging the obligations of enemies. The restored Mexican republic repudiated the debts
of the French-supported Hapsburg emperor Maximilian in 1867, “on
the ground that they were contracted for the purpose of combating the
constitutional government.”27 In 1868, the fourteenth amendment of the
US Constitution voided outstanding civil war debts “incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States.”28 The Costa Rican
and Soviet repudiations discussed in chapters 3 and 4 similarly reject the
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idea of paying the debts of another. These episodes highlight how, as the
meaning of “sovereign” becomes less personalistic and more associated
with abstract statehood, the idea that debt can permanently attach to a
governmental entity becomes plausible. But they also demonstrate that
pressure can build to authenticate the legitimate character of the borrowing regime in question.
At the center of the debt continuity norm, then, is neither market discipline, nor the idea of governmental rule per se, but rather the ephemeral
and multifarious idea of sovereignty itself. Although fi nancial writers
might use the term “theological” dismissively in referring to contemporary discussions of debt legitimacy, in many ways the term is fitting. 29
Political theorists have pointed out that underlying the modern structure
of international relations is a secularized theology or metatheory of the
sovereign state.30 Just as theology deals with the nature of god and its
relationship to man, this secularized theology of the sovereign state specifies the nature of the state and its relationship to the people. Principal
among these theological exports has been the idea of a unitary and omnipotent god, transformed into the absolutist or “command” theory of
a unitary and omnipotent sovereign state. But, as the following discussion makes clear, this statist politics of sovereignty, a version of which
underlies the doctrine of sovereign continuity, is not the only possible
approach to sovereignty or sovereign contracting. Indeed, the Western
philosophical tradition grounding current international relations provides a range of competing ideas based in popular, rule-of-law, and outcome-oriented theories. And these alternatives, all of which have found
defenders through the last century, may well fit more comfortably with
our current sensibilities.

Who Can Sign? The Statist Roots
of Contemporary Debt Contracts
Where does the statist idea of sovereignty embedded in current lending
norms come from, and how deep does it go? In this absolutist conception, the sovereign is simply the juridical body that has ultimate control
and authority over a given people and territory, and that issues commands within that territory in the form of general laws and sui generis
orders. This sovereign is functionally similar and juridically equal to
other sovereigns, and the structure and legitimacy of its internal constitution, culture, and stage of development are conceptually irrelevant to
its external relations. This framework conceives of the sovereign state
as a secularized deity—the supreme power within its realm, subject to
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no law or higher authority and equal only to other states. It might also
be understood as the latter-day incarnation of an absolutist, divine, or
militarist conception of rulership, updated to fit modern defi nitions of
states as territorially bounded. 31
In Western political theory, Jean Bodin provided perhaps the fi rst of
these explicit accounts, by defi ning sovereignty in the sixteenth century
as “the highest power of command” and “the absolute and perpetual
power of a commonwealth.”32 This tradition was carried forward by
Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, both of whom considered the
sovereign as constituting the supreme law-making authority, free from
limitation on its actions. 33 In this view, it does not matter how the governmental entity claiming sovereign status gains control. It may do so
by liberal democratic means, by other constitutional means, or by force
alone—the strictly statist requirements for sovereign action pay little
attention. As Bodin makes explicit, “If [power is taken] by force, [the
government] is called a tyranny. Yet the tyrant is nonetheless a sovereign,
just as the violent possession of a robber is true and natural possession even if against the law, and those who had it previously are dispossessed.”34 Although Hobbes distinguished between sovereignty by force
and sovereignty by voluntary institution, he insisted that “the rights and
consequences of sovereignty are the same in both.”35
This tradition carries into legal and constitutional theory as well, as
represented by the classical positivism of John Austin, who understood
law as the command of the sovereign backed by force.36 And in his formulation of positivist international law in 1912, Lassa Oppenheim similarly rejected the moral foundations and judgments implied by natural
law accounts.37 In denying the relevance of internal culture, religion,
or political form, he sought to organize international law on the basis
of sovereign equality and state consent. Or in the preferred metaphor
of international relations theory, this account of sovereignty conceives
of the state as a “unitary black box” whose internal machinations are
irrelevant to its foreign interactions. 38
This principle of recognizing sovereign governments on the basis of
command or effective control was accepted as a central principle of
modern international law by early members of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. For example, J. B. Moore, a prominent American
jurist and member of the Court, wrote in the early 1900s,
The origin and organization of government are questions generally of internal discussion and decision. Foreign powers deal with the existing de
facto government, when sufficiently established to give reasonable assurance of its permanence, and of the acquiescence of those who constitute the
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its external obligations. 39

This essential commitment to disregarding internal differences and the
possibility of internal coercion is enshrined in the basic legal principles
of twentieth-century international relations—equal sovereignty and the
doctrine of nonintervention, as highlighted in Article 2 of the UN charter. International or “external” sovereignty in this statist approach is
thus based on effective control and recognition by the community of
states. As a consequence, it pays little attention to the potential internal
dimensions of sovereignty.40 The central contours of this statist framework have remained fairly stable into the turn of this century.41
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of agency or authority to enter into contracts? The answer here is relatively straightforward:
whoever exercises control may sign the sovereign contract. And because
the state’s population is not considered the “principal” of the state in any
true sense, no real agency problem exists. The core relationship between
the people and the government is not characterized as one of principal
and agent but rather, in the language of John Austin, as one of “sovereignty and subjection.”42 The people under this theory of sovereignty are
ultimately “subjects” of the state, who are subject to the commands and
obligations of whichever government successfully controls them. This
political theory should look familiar to those working in international
capital markets today: regimes that rule by force, exploit local communities, and violate their own laws may still enter into international agreements under statist norms.
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Who Can Repudiate? The Rise of the Eternal Sovereign
So, we know that even widely disparaged governments may enter into
internationally binding obligations according to statist political thought.
But the second key question is whether a successor regime must be
bound by that prior regime’s actions under this approach or whether, in
the alternative, the successor still has a presumed right to disclaim the
debt. There are two opposing answers to this question even within the
statist framework, which in the Western tradition corresponds to a split
between late medieval thought and the high modernism of the Scientific
Revolution.
The fi rst approach, associated with late medieval political theory, insists on the eternal nature of the state apart from any changes in actual
rulership, and thus considers sovereignty to live forever. In the early and
high Middle Ages, the Christian conceptual universe had been divided

Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Modern Finance

39

into the eternal/transcendental and the temporal/profane realms. While
a ruler derived legitimacy from the eternal divine, he himself was a temporal being. With the shift away from this dualist aspect of the late Middle Ages, however, space emerged for an intermediate arena in which
earthly beings—such as states—might yet have eternal duration. Thus,
previewing more contemporary jurists and financial actors, the late medieval legal theorist Baldus di Ubaldi argued, “A realm contains not only
material territory but also the peoples of the realm . . . And the totality
or commonweal of the realm does not die, because a commonweal continues to exist even after the kings have been driven away. For the commonweal cannot die . . . it lives forever.”43 Although Bodin is rightly cited
as an early modern political theorist for insisting that sovereignty may
be claimed by undisguised force rather than through divine blessing, on
the question of sovereign continuity he hearkens back to this earlier age.
Bodin considered both sovereignty and the status of the “sovereign” to
be perpetual, transferring to whoever gains effective control of a state’s
territory.44 Jens Bartelson emphasizes that this combination of state continuity with ruler discontinuity is an essential aspect of what he calls the
“proto-sovereignty” of the late medieval era. “The body politic could be
accounted for as something ontologically separate from the existence of
the ruler within it, yet as something continuous, transcending the life of
the ruler in time and space.” He emphasizes the importance of this move,
in which “we witness the fi rst steps towards a theory of inalienability,
which implies a set of rights well separated from those of the individual
king.”45 Along with these inalienable rights of the eternal state, it would
seem, can come inalienable obligations. In this premodern framework of
the eternal state, sovereign obligations might remain even in the case of
major regime change. Although medieval scholars intended this vision
of sovereignty to be secular, to many contemporary political theorists it
retains “a whiff of incense from another world.”46
Despite this particular historicity and provenance, the doctrine of sovereign continuity is very much alive in practice today. Echoing Baldus in
the fourteenth century, J. B. Moore in the early twentieth clearly links
the status of sovereign to the theory of sovereign sempiternity, and then
to the continuity of contractual obligations:
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule
affect its position in international law. . . . though the government changes,
the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. . . . The principle of the continuity of states has important results. The state is bound
by engagements entered into by governments that have ceased to exist; the
restored government is generally liable for the acts of the usurper.47
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The Financial Times continues the trend into the twenty-fi rst century in
its insistence—without irony—that we avoid “theological” discussion
and simply accept the eternal nature of states for the purposes of enforcing debt obligations. At least in contemporary international fi nancial
circles, the innovation of late medieval jurists lives on.
Notwithstanding its remarkable resilience, the theoretical innovation
of unbroken sovereignty did not stand alone in the early modern tradition of Western political thought. The opposing approach, associated
with Hobbes and the high modernism of the Scientific Revolution, insists
more explicitly on the sovereign’s absolute right to do as it pleases, which
would include contract repudiation. Although he shared Bodin’s indifference to competing forms of internal rule and the mechanism of gaining sovereign power, Hobbes very explicitly considered his work to stand
upon a more materialist conception of the universe. Drawing inspiration
from the revolution taking place in the natural sciences in mid-seventeenth-century Europe—and keenly aware of the ravages wrought by the
religiously inspired Thirty Years War—Hobbes rejected both religious
foundations and any Platonic idea of eternal essences in formulating his
political vision. He insisted instead that “every part of the universe is
body, and that which is not body is no part of the universe.”48
Perhaps unsurprisingly, he took a fairly materialist view of sovereign
existence and power, including in times of succession. Unlike the late
medievalists and Bodin, Hobbes did not consider that sovereignty could
exist forever, ungrounded from actual rulership. He was especially concerned with clarity in sovereign succession precisely because without
this the choice would be uncertain, and “then is the commonwealth dissolved” and “the multitude [left] without any sovereign at all.”49 Hobbes
joined this materialism with an insistence on the sovereign’s indivisible
right to determine the means necessary to promote the interests of the
commonwealth and its subjects. Thus sovereign power is absolute, “as
great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.”50 This is not to say
that the sovereign cannot constrain its own actions and encourage stable
interaction by promulgating laws and binding itself through contracts.
Although Hobbes was primarily concerned with the prospect of civil
disorder and internal constraint, this ability to bind would presumably
extend to the realm of external contracts as well. However, these constraints would always be contingent and subject to repudiation on the
basis of sovereign status and power alone.51
While Hobbes is rightly considered foundational to modern thinking
about sovereign states, an adoption of his strictly materialist approach
in sovereign lending would entail a radical departure from today’s
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dominant practices. The debt continuity norm in modern international
fi nance owes its existence to older, more religiously grounded strains of
thought in the Western philosophical tradition. In its legal and normative expectation that states never die, the contemporary economic framework adopts the version of continuous statism associated with Bodin
and late Medieval scholars. In this view, each new ruler or regime is not
granted a clean slate on which to make decisions (or build a new reputation), but rather is assumed to be the reincarnation of an indefinitely
ongoing sovereign existence.
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An Alternative Authorization Grounded in the People
Perhaps the most vocal competitor to a statist politics of sovereignty
today is the idea of popular or democratic sovereignty. This broader ideology, which has become increasingly prominent over the last century,
has markedly opposed consequences when translated into the sovereign
debt regime. In this framework, sovereignty ultimately lies with a “sovereign people,” whose authorization provides legitimacy to the state and its
external interactions. Both the sovereign state and the laws it promulgates
are valid only if they reflect the consent of the underlying population. The
mechanism by which this consent finds expression is not specified, and
may be direct or through representation. We can even imagine, at the
outer edges of popular sovereignty, the possibility of a consensual monarchy. The key is that the state as a secularized deity has been dethroned,
and now is subject in some way to the ultimately sovereign people. Under
this approach, not all states are properly or equally “sovereign” simply
by virtue of their territorial command. The evaluation and recognition of
true sovereignty—and therefore of valid sovereign obligation—requires
the consideration of a regime’s internal practices.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands as a central thinker in this approach.
Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, he conceived of a “sovereign
will” founded in a social contract as providing a form of government
“by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys
only himself and remains as free as before.”52 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès
followed in insisting on the unity of the nation with the people in the
context of the French Revolution. “The Third Estate [the order of the
common people as distinct from nobility and clergy] thus encompasses
everything pertaining to the Nation, and everyone outside the Third Estate cannot be considered to be a member of the Nation.”53 Thomas Paine,
also reflecting upon the French Revolution and equating the nation with
the larger public, commented, “Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of
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mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is
restored to its natural and original place, the nation.”54 The commitment
to basic self-legislation found expression in the work of Immanuel Kant
as well, although Kant understood self-legislation primarily as “freedom from tutelage” in the realm of thought.55 This attentiveness to the
relevance of a state’s internal makeup also resonates with the Liberal
school of international relations theory, which explains the international
behavior of states on the basis of their internal characteristics. 56
The idea of a sovereign government as fundamentally grounded in the
consent or authorization of the people has translated fairly smoothly
into an admittedly controversial principle of international law. In this
view, a sovereign state may be legally recognized—and thus capable of
valid international action—only if the state is constituted by popular
means. Woodrow Wilson in particular is associated with this discourse
of international interaction, due to his stated commitment to the principle of self-determination in the League of Nations and his own administration’s refusal to recognize governments claiming sovereignty by
force.57 While still grounded in the limitations provided by state structures and territorial boundaries, this approach resonates with the Cosmopolitan school of political theory and international law, which puts
individual rights at the center of any legitimate polity or legal system. It
is manifest in the emerging language of international judicial decisions
and foreign policy, which Ruti Teitel analyzes as “humanity law.”58 The
strong version of this approach presents a vision of consent, sovereignty,
and human rights that is in deep tension with a statist concept of sovereignty as command. Modern day champions of a Wilsonian ideal of
sovereign legitimacy, such as Michael Reisman, continue to promote this
view of a “new constitutive, human-rights based conception of popular
sovereignty.”59 Some legal scholars, such as Thomas Franck, have gone
so far as to insist that contemporary international law in fact contains
an emerging right to democratic governance.60
This democratic or popular framework of sovereignty suggests a
unique relationship between the people and state legality and legitimacy.
Unlike the statist conception of sovereign as command, in which law
is imposed by force on a subject people, here the people themselves are
sovereign and thus exist prior to the law. Rousseau makes clear that the
people acting as sovereign are free even from the constraints of their
own prior laws, as “it is contrary to the nature of the body politic that
the sovereign impose upon itself a law it could not break.”61 Sieyès distinguished between a government and the underlying people or nation
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that provides the authorization for governmental action. “Government
can exercise real power only insofar as it is constitutional. It is legal only
insofar as it is faithful to the laws imposed upon it. The national will,
on the other hand, simply needs the reality of its existence to be legal.
It is the origin of all legality.”62 Thus, law and valid government action
exist, but in a very different form than that found in other approaches
to sovereignty.
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of agency or authority to enter into contracts? Authority should derive from the sovereign
people—now properly understood to be the principal in any sovereign
contract—either acting directly or through their representatives. Government officers act as their agents, and so long as they act according to the
roles assigned to them or the mechanisms established by the underlying
people, they have authority to bind the sovereign nation. In this framework, the people are subject only to those contracts that their authorized
agents have entered, once they have been constituted as “sovereign.”
In this approach, sovereign obligations, properly understood, do not
exist unless they have actually been properly authorized by the population. A regime change in which a democratic sovereign government
comes into being after a period of rule by other means would effectively
constitute the fi rst appearance of a legitimate sovereign government.
The previously existing government would not in fact have comprised
a proper sovereign state, but only a private form of rule imposed on the
underlying and disempowered sovereign people. Therefore, regimes that
rule by force would not be able to enter into international agreements
that bind the population after their fall. And if sovereignty is conceived
under this more democratic or popular framework, creditors who lend
to such regimes cannot expect to be repaid after a regime change. This
is not necessarily to say that all previously existing obligations would be
repudiated. On the contrary, they would likely be evaluated by the newly
empowered sovereign on a pragmatic basis. However, this pragmatic approach is very different from that implied by the doctrine of sovereign
continuity, which presumes the perpetual nature of any sovereign obligation on the basis of strictly statist assumptions about sovereignty.

Sovereign Authorization Delimited by Law
Although the tension between strictly statist and popular conceptions
of sovereignty is perhaps most well known, an intermediate alternative
relevant through the last century exists in what might be called “rule of
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law” or constitutional sovereignty. Like popular sovereignty, this school
pays attention to internal modes of legitimation in recognizing valid sovereign action. However, it does not require that this internal authorization ultimately come from the underlying people. The sovereign state
exists and is both empowered and limited by its internal constitution or
rule of law, whether or not it is democratic. Thus, an internal rule-of-law
or constitutional framework that denotes a nonconsensual monarchical or other nondemocratic political order would be sufficient to authorize—and render presumptively binding—sovereign action.
This concept of sovereignty is not as well developed into a coherent
school of political theory as strictly statist or popular sovereignty. However, it relates to Max Weber’s basic insight that the use of force is not
a means specific to states alone, and that therefore force cannot be the
sole defi ning characteristic of statehood. Writing in the early twentieth
century, Weber thus modified the basic defi nition of a sovereign state
to include the element of legitimacy; a state in this view is “a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.”63 Unlike democratic or
liberal theorists, Weber himself did not insist on any substantive internal requirements for this ultimate legitimacy, and considered that different types of domestic regimes would be consonant with legitimate
statehood.64 Perhaps the paradigmatic legal theorist working in this approach was Hans Kelsen, who sought to identify and understand law
as “pure”—a separate and internally coherent order independent from
politics and morality.65 Kelsen follows John Austin in separating valid
law from moral questions, but differs in that he does not consider law
to be ultimately reducible to force. Rather, the promulgation of acts and
statutes by a sovereign government can only be identified as legally valid
within the context of that state’s own internal norms or legal rules, which
in turn build from the basic norm (grundnorm) or constitution of that
polity. This basic norm itself “cannot be derived from a higher norm,”
but instead “constitutes the unity in the multitude of norms by representing the reason for the validity of all norms that belong to this order.”66
Kelsen sought to provide law with the clearest possible “decision rule,”
emphasizing law as an autonomous and internally coherent order and
thus granting it objectivity and stability. In so doing, he hoped to insulate it from the subjectivity and uncertainty inherent in the concept
of law as sovereign command—whether the sovereign be an individual
ruling by force or the people as a whole. In this, Kelsen foreshadowed
Hannah Arendt’s political commitment to a constitutional system of
checks and balances, as well as her concern about the instability and
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potential extremism that could arise in both absolutist rule and pure
popular sovereignty.67
The rule-of-law or constitutionalist conception of sovereignty as determined and limited by internal norms or rules of law can translate into
the international realm as well. In this framework, international law
and international affairs would remain interested in questions of internal state legitimacy. However, this approach would not investigate the
substantive democratic legitimacy or internal human rights compliance
of governments. Rather, it would focus on ensuring states’ commitments
to a more procedural vision of rule of law in both the domestic and
international spheres. Conservative early twentieth-century American
lawyers, including Supreme Court Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft, were at the forefront of this rule-of-law approach in
the international arena.68
How would this paradigm translate into a theory of authority to enter
into external debt contracts? Authority should derive from a vision of
the sovereign as constituted and limited by law, so a government actor
could act on behalf of the state as a whole, including its people and territory, as long as it follows the domestic legal framework. Even the government official who originally promulgated the law under which he or she
acts must then stay within its purview, as any actor is ultimately subject
to the law itself. Kelsen presents this dynamic of law-making authority and subjection to law as follows: “Only a competent authority can
create valid norms; and such competence can only be based on a norm
that authorizes the issuing of norms. The authority authorized to issue
norms is subject to that norm in the same manner as the individuals are
subject to the norms issued by the authority.”69 Given this fundamental
commitment to rule of law (or basic constitutionalism) as such—as distinguished from an adherence to liberal democratic constitutionalism,
for example—neither the particular internal form of the state nor the
substantive content of rules and laws are important. So long as internal
rules are followed, the appropriate government official can act as an
agent for the sovereign state, thus binding the territory and population
under that state’s legal framework.
Under this approach, sovereign obligations exist and are continuous
if they have been validly authorized under the internal legal framework, even if that internal framework is distasteful according to some
moral standards. If the proper internal rules were followed, the sovereign obligation stands whether the previous regime was autocratic or
democratic. Thus, a regime change in which a democratic government
comes to power after a period of rule by other means should not alter the
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existence of a sovereign obligation, so long as that obligation was validly incurred under the internal rules of the previous contracting regime.
Therefore, even a nondemocratic regime may enter into international
agreements that bind the underlying population, so long as it specifies
and then follows its own laws. And if sovereignty is conceived through
this rule-of-law framework, then creditors who lend to nonrepresentative regimes may still expect repayment if they carefully respect that regime’s internal constitution and rule of law. In short, this conception of
sovereignty modifies somewhat the strictest doctrine of sovereign continuity. Sovereign obligations persist, regardless of regime form or regime
transformation, so long as the internal rule of law in place at the time of
the contract is respected by both parties to the contract: the sovereign
government and the external contracting party.

Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved.

Sovereign Action as Outcome-Oriented
The three schools discussed above present visions of sovereignty that
are ultimately process oriented—they interrogate the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a given state and underscore the procedures of sovereign contracting that this relationship entails. However,
a discussion of the political concepts underlying sovereign debt may
also focus on the outcome of such contracts. An outcome orientation
in sovereign contracting would require that valid sovereign action be
in the interests of the state, broadly understood. This orientation is not
at all exclusive to any one of the three different procedural schools of
sovereignty discussed above. Indeed, the internal procedures by which
a sovereign action is decided or acted upon are conceptually unrelated
to this approach; the action could be undertaken according to absolutist
or democratic means, either following or disregarding the internal rule
of law. What matters instead is attentiveness to the ultimate outcome
or intended beneficiary: a given sovereign state itself, rather than those
who act in its name.
This outcome orientation is, at least potentially, entirely complementary with either of the statist, popular, or rule-of-law accounts. Indeed,
each of these process-based approaches may be understood as part of
the larger metaparadigm of statehood characteristic of the modern era,
which conceives of sovereignty as limited to an established (if expandable) territorial boundary. This geographical groundedness counters earlier ideas of a personalized sovereign ruler unifying an essentially private
domain of otherwise disconnected territories. The modern concept of
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sovereignty not only grounded sovereign statehood in a given geographic
realm, but also attempted to strip the now explicitly public state from
its association with rulership as private ownership.70 In place of the language of personal domain, modern discourse substitutes the language
of commonwealth, public protection, and state interest. Hobbes, who
insisted on there being no distinction in the basic sovereign rights of an
“instituted” as opposed to an “acquired” sovereign, still postulated the
initial existence of the sovereign state itself in terms of the security and
order of the underlying commonwealth. Bodin, among the most absolute of the traditionalist thinkers, shared this language of the sovereign
state as “commonwealth” rather than disconnected private domain. The
concept of modern statehood as linked to internal responsiveness is even
clearer in the popular and rule-of-law visions of sovereignty.
Several thinkers of the early to mid-modern period thought fairly explicitly about the relationship of sovereignty to sovereign debt through
this model of basic responsiveness to underlying public interest. Previewing arguments afoot today, they warned that sovereign debt or
“public credit” could make government officials overattentive to the
needs and desires of creditors, and also enable them to embark upon
understudied misadventures. This dependence would render the state
less responsive to true public need and neglectful of the greater national
interest. Sieyès, one of the key thinkers in the school of popular sovereignty, was hostile to the entire idea of sovereign debt and favored
instead building public fi nance on a system of taxation. In fact, one of
his central political writings on the French Revolution focused on the
centrality of instituting a tax law. This law of taxation would allow
the power of money to “be merged with and, so to speak, made to be
identified with the nation so that it can never serve anything other than
the general interest.”71 He considered the rejection of public credit so
fundamental to a truly responsive constitutional government that he
self-consciously called his proposed tax law nothing less than a “constitutional law of taxation.”72 This is not to say that Sieyès favored an
immediate repudiation of the monarchist debt; in fact, he felt it should
be repaid on practical grounds.73
This concern with the potentially detrimental effects of sovereign
debt on a nation’s core responsiveness to public need was not limited to
Sieyès, the paradigmatic popular sovereigntist. The monarchist David
Hume famously claimed in 1752 that, “either the nation must destroy
public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation.”74 Istvan Hont
has highlighted how Hume’s deep suspicion of sovereign debt fi nancing
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drew from his concern for national security in the face of potential international disorder. Hume felt that public credit tended to sacrifice the
nation’s long-term strategic interests for the short-term concern of maintaining fi nancial stability, and also to embolden government officials
to embark on capricious escapades. Hume was “quite ready to counsel
sacrificing the property of thousands (he estimated that Britain had approximately 17,000 foreign and domestic creditors) on the altar of the
nation’s national security interests,” and felt this much preferable “to the
horrible political crime of sacrificing millions for the temporary safety
of creditors.”75
As Sieyès and Hume make clear, the argument that sovereign debt
may be inherently antithetical to public responsiveness and the national
interest is not a distinctly contemporary contention. Today’s concerns
about lost economic sovereignty are not at all new, and are in fact almost as old as the modern conception of statehood itself. The claim
that a sovereign state, however it is internally constituted, should be
attentive to the national interest, does not need to reach the extremes of
Sieyès and Hume. This “outcome orientation” could result in a separate
requirement that government action should be responsive to the public
needs of a state, whether those are defi ned in statist, rule-of-law, or
popular terms. This impulse might be operationalized in a requirement
that valid sovereign debt at least ostensibly serve the public interest of
the state, as distinct from the merely personal interest of a ruling elite
masquerading as a modern officialdom.76 Indeed, the second prong of
the odious debt doctrine as imagined by Alexander Sack—that debt
may be considered odious if it does not benefit the underlying population—offers such an example.

Caveats and Normative Ramifications
Three caveats are important before going any further. First, this discussion should not be misunderstood as either an attempt to provide
anything close to a sufficient interpretation of the thinkers mentioned
or a comprehensive overview of theories (or theorists) of sovereignty.
The four paradigms highlighted here, which resonate across political
theory, law, and international relations, demonstrate how different ideas
of political legitimacy result in divergent expectations about government
competence for sovereign contracts and the subsequent continuity of
those contracts. However, the theorists within each approach disagree
with each other in myriad ways and may on some questions have more
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in common with scholars I have categorized as belonging to a different
school. Furthermore, theories of sovereignty could be organized along
different dimensions altogether, or divided into a more detailed categorization. The key is that the implicit or explicit adoption of one as opposed
to another politically contested vision of sovereignty will result in very
different understandings of what is rational, appropriate, and reputationally enforceable. A summary of this analytical structure is presented
schematically in Table 2.1.
The second and related caveat is that, although this discussion highlights the politics at the center of sovereign debt, it should not necessarily
be taken as a normative assessment of either these ideas of sovereignty
in their own right or their appropriateness for international fi nance.
Certainly, a sharper framework for talking about sovereign legitimacy
enables clearer political and moral debate, and I will touch upon policy
questions in this book’s conclusion.77 However, I intend my categorization to serve two principal purposes that are analytically prior to policy
argument. First, the discussion gives lie to any descriptive contention
that a working sovereign lending system can possibly be apolitical and
neutral. Indeed, the dominant continuity norm is deeply indebted to a
vision of the state with roots in a particular (and contested) political
philosophy. And second, these categories can be used as analytical building blocks to enable an empirical assessment of why one as opposed to
another political philosophy holds sway in international debt fi nance
today. Conceiving of these schools as “ideal types” helps to identify historical variation in the conceptual framework that underlies sovereign
debt over time. In the historical discussion of the following chapters, I
use them as such to underscore the shifting claims and outcomes in sovereign debt and reputation through the last century.
And, fi nally, it is important to point out that any sovereignty concept
has both an internal and an external dimension. I have focused primarily
on internal sovereignty, or the “fundamental authority relation within
states between rulers and ruled.”78 However, these internal relations are
in turn linked to an external dimension of sovereignty, or “a fundamental authority relation between states which is defi ned by international
law.”79 To enter into an internationally enforceable contract, a sovereign
must exist in both dimensions. It must have sufficient standing or recognition internationally to be considered a valid sovereign actor, able to
make acknowledged promises on behalf of a state. It must also have the
necessary relationship with the underlying people and territory to allow
it to extract the resources (natural, fi nancial, or human) to perform on a

Rule-of-Law
Sovereignty

(Two versions)

Statist Sovereignty

Framework

Weber; Kelsen; Arendt

Government is both
created/legitimated
and limited through
rule of law.

Hobbes (discontinuous/
material sovereignty)

Premoderns & Bodin
(continuous/eternal
sovereignty);

Relationship of
command. Government
is supreme and stands
above the law.

Internal
Sovereignty

Taft

Internal respect for rule
of law/constitutionalism
may affect foreign
relations (variants of
Liberal theory).

Continuous: Agreements
bind successors.

Waltz

Oppenheim

Government is
valid/recognized if
it exercises control
through law/legal
mechanisms.

Minimal requirement for
competence/agency; even
those that rule by force and
fail to follow their own law
may make international
agreements.

The state is understood
to be a “unitary black
box” whose internal
machinations are
irrelevant to foreign
interactions.

Government is
recognized if it has
effective control over
a territory, regardless
of the internal
mechanisms of control.

International acts are valid
and binding if they follow
internal requirements for
competence or ratification,
even if those mechanisms
are nondemocratic.

Discontinuous: Sovereign
retains repudiation option.

Ability to Make
Binding Contracts

Related Explanatory
Framework

External
Sovereignty

table 2.1. Sovereignty Frameworks and their Ramifications
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Outcome
Orientation

Popular
Sovereignty

Process of internal rule
is irrelevant so long as
it produces acceptable
outcomes.

Rousseau; Sieyès; Paine

Government must reflect
the consent or choice of
the ultimate “sovereign,”
the underlying people.
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Sieyès; Hume

Government is
externally valid/
recognized if it produces
positive outcomes for
the state’s population.

Wilson

Government is valid/
recognized if it is
popularly authorized.

Kant

The internal
governmental form
or local interests
are central to
understanding state
action (variants of
Liberal theory, i.e.,
democratic peace).

Minimal agency/
competence requirements.
Sovereign contract/action
is valid and binding if its
(intended) outcome benefits
the public.

Sovereign action is
internationally valid if the
government is popularly
authorized. Basic rule of
law/constitutionalism alone
is insufficient to bind if it
does not reflect the people’s
underlying consent.
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contract or repay a debt. Although these two elements are conceptually
separate, in practice they frequently reinforce each other. A sovereign
actor with a strong and clear relationship with the underlying people and
territory should have fewer problems gaining international recognition
and entering transnational contracts than a sovereign actor with only a
tenuous link. However, the reverse channel of influence can also work:
international recognition and capital may allow a government with only
a tenuous internal link to strengthen its relationship of domestic control.
In short, the recognition and enforcement practice of any sovereign debt
regime both depends upon and reinforces a given sovereignty paradigm.
The doctrine of sovereign continuity, a central philosophical support for
the current sovereign debt regime, rests on and gives force to a statist
conception of legitimate sovereignty. Laying bare the theoretical claims
implicit in sovereign debt practices can thus sharpen our historical analysis of the lending system and provide the groundwork for more cleareyed assessments of its ramifications.
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Case Studies in the Historical Narrative
Considering theories of sovereignty may well be analytically important,
but how can we study the historical development of these concepts in
actual debt practices? If a politics of sovereign legitimacy is indeed implicated in every debt interaction and reputational assessment, the universe
of potential cases is virtually limitless. Although the following chapters
unfold in roughly chronological order, they do not constitute anything
close to a complete history of the sovereign debt regime. Instead, I construct a genealogy of how debt continuity norms associated with a statist
discourse dominated over other plausible alternatives in modern debt
and creditworthiness. As such, I make use of historical events and cases
insofar as they help us understand the contingent factors that enabled or
disabled more flexible approaches to debt continuity.
In selecting cases to study over the last century, I have focused particularly on those in which we might expect to see resistance to debt
continuity—and then asked whether or not any such resistance materialized or resulted in an actual repudiation. In chapter 1, I suggested that
the issue of odious debt best highlights the questions of this book, and
also that debt repudiations would be most likely to occur in situations
of regime change. Therefore, I take a look at those regime changes most
likely to result in odious debt claims. One possible set involves social
revolutions, which explicitly reject the legitimacy of the previous regime
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and frequently seek to refashion the social and economic as well as the
political structure of the state. As such, regimes resulting from social
revolutions would reasonably be expected to repudiate the debts of the
previous regime, particularly those debts used for projects that the new
regime fi nds objectionable.80 Another range of cases includes postdictatorial democracies, which do not necessarily seek to rework the entire
foundations of the state, but do aim to place the nation on a more representative political footing. They could be expected to repudiate debt
that has been lost to corruption, or debt associated with contracts signed
due to political favor.81 I have for the purposes of this book laid aside the
question of postcolonial regimes and state succession, in part in order
to limit the potential universe of cases but also because a separate body
of law and treaty interpretation has emerged with regard to state succession.82 As such, while these cases provide helpful background they
are as a whole less appropriate for thinking through the mechanisms
supporting debt continuity more generally. I also do not consider postmonarchical or postimperial regimes, which may consider their predecessor governmental forms inappropriate for a new historical period but
still tend to claim continuity with the history (as well as the wealth and
glory) of the previous regime.83
Within this universe of potential cases, my approach focuses on the
contingent historical factors that enable or disable certain possibilities at
key historical moments. In studying a particular country case, therefore,
my goal is not dispositively to explicate state or creditor action. Rather,
it is to understand how discursive frameworks and material conditions
construct behavioral pathways and thus render certain decisions more
or less likely. In one phrasing, this approach “is less directed toward
answering the question ‘why’ than the question ‘how,’ or, more specifically, ‘how possible’.”84 In other words, while some projects focus on
why actors select one path over another, this approach focuses instead
on the prior issue of how a potential choice is constructed or closed off.
In effect, a state’s ultimate reason for taking a particular decision is
less central, while the conditions that make that decision conceivable or
plausible constitute the core of my study.
As such, different country cases play very different roles in the study
and thus are given varying weight and space in the analysis. Through
the case studies of the Soviet Union and Costa Rica in chapters 3 and 4,
I argue that the early twentieth century constituted a potential turning
point in the debt regime—an open moment in how ideas of legitimate
statehood and sovereign continuity fit into international debt and reputation. These deeper case studies reveal the possibility that an alternative
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discourse and practice could have been adopted more widely. This is
not to say that state and creditor decisions emanate directly from these
larger structures; this gives insufficient weight to the agency of particular decision makers and social groups. Rather, the focus is on how
an action taken by a particular state—and perhaps a particularly brave
or foolhardy state—was enabled by broader circumstances and in turn
could have enabled further flexibility going forward.
The openness that these two cases reveal about the early twentieth
century raises questions about why additional cases did not materialize
in the mid- and late twentieth century. In chapters 5 and 6, I highlight
how new material and ideational circumstances emerged in ways that
undermined the early twentieth-century potential. Part of the historical
puzzle for my analysis is precisely the absence of cases that pose a serious challenge to the dominant discourse and practice. While my interest
in studying this lacuna undermines the plausibility of a pure case study
method, these chapters highlight several situations in which a challenge
to the statist framework was either attempted or would have been most
likely to occur. Just as state action can underscore the enabling potential
of broader material and ideational frameworks, partial state action or
the absence of state action where it might otherwise be expected can
illustrate how a particular context closed off certain possibilities.
In thinking through these cases as manifestations of a particular practice or as potential turning points, I ask three sets of questions: First, to
what degree are principles or claims presented and actions taken that
challenge the dominant discourse and practice? Although such articulations will frequently be made by states themselves, this is not necessarily
the case. Given that norms are expectations of appropriate action shared
by a community of actors, other “members of the community” may well
provide arguments that enable states to act in ways that shift the longrun practices. Second, what is the immediate argumentation or response
by other relevant actors for a given issue? Such actors may include interlocutors in a particular claim or dispute, external decision makers, and
other relevant figures. Such a response may be hostile, receptive, or may
vary across actors. The nature of the response is important as well. Are
interlocutors hostile to the formulation of a claim, its practical effect,
or both? Part of the claim may be rejected (i.e., the existence of a right
to repudiate) while another part is implicitly accepted (i.e., that after repudiation a state should be treated as an “unseasoned borrower” rather
than a “lemon”). Finally, what is the longer-term reaction of the relevant
actors (i.e., creditors and government actors who serve as gatekeepers),
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and to what degree is their response uniform? In the case of sovereignty
and odious debt treatment, is creditor willingness or unwillingness to
lend a response to an assessment of creditworthiness (which implicitly
suggests a theory of sovereignty, as I discuss above) or are there other
issues involved?
As should be clear from the foregoing, the particular characteristics
that are relevant for any given country’s experience are likely to vary
across case and historical period. Just as the uniform repayment norm itself is more complex than it fi rst appears, its historical study escapes easy
simplification. I have identified creditor interactions and broader norms
of sovereignty as key in shaping possibilities in sovereign debt and reputation. However, the particular historical contours of these factors—and
the ways in which specific actors react to these larger structures—are
necessarily specific to time and place.

Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved.

Conclusion
Mainstream approaches to international fi nance implicitly assume that
it is theoretically untenable and impracticable to suggest alternatives to
the current expectation of consistent repayment, or to ask about ideas of
sovereign legitimacy underlying debt and reputation. These suppositions
act as a bulwark against real engagement with proposals to alter the
global debt regime in any significant way. However, the political theory
and expected economic practice surrounding sovereign debt are not as
unvarying as they initially appear. The assumptions of political neutrality, reputational stability, and creditor uniformity do not hold. And different concepts of sovereignty suggest alternative plausible approaches
to debt obligations. As the following chapters emphasize, this theoretical openness is joined by historical variation. The dominant norm of
debt continuity is not an ahistorical market principle but rather has been
actively constructed and supported by changing market structures and
broader political ideologies over the last century.
Although efforts can be made to cordon off the political realm from
international business and fi nance, politicized concepts and arguments
eventually tend to slip through. Given that the international debate surrounding sovereign legitimacy is unlikely to die down, it makes sense
for those involved in the international economic arena to address the
question of sovereignty head-on rather than risk being blindsided farther down the road. In the following chapters, I highlight how these

56

r e t hink in g s o v er e i gn d e b t

Copyright © ${Date}. ${Publisher}. All rights reserved.

questions of state legitimacy, reputation, and debt continuity have come
to life in the concrete experiences of states, their creditors, and the other
global actors that play a role in the sovereign debt arena. And these past
experiences should offer some insight into how sovereign debt issues—at
their intersection with questions of reputation and politics—are likely to
unfold into the future.

